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EQUILIBRIUM WAGE DISPERSION WITH WORKER 
AND EMPLOYER HETEROGENEITY 
BY FABIEN POSTEL-VINAY AND JEAN-MARC ROBIN' 
We construct and estimate an equilibrium search model with on-the-job-search. Firms 
make take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to workers conditional on their characteristics and they 
can respond to the outside job offers received by their employees. Unobserved worker 
productive heterogeneity is introduced in the form of cross-worker differences in a "com- 
petence" parameter. On the other side of the market, firms also are heterogeneous with 
respect to their marginal productivity of labor. The model delivers a theory of steady- 
state wage dispersion driven by heterogenous worker abilities and firm productivities, as 
well as by matching frictions. The structural model is estimated using matched employer 
and employee French panel data. The exogenous distributions of worker and firm hetero- 
geneity components are nonparametrically estimated. We use this structural estimation to 
provide a decomposition of cross-employee wage variance. We find that the share of the 
cross-sectional wage variance that is explained by person effects varies across skill groups. 
Specifically, this share lies close to 40% for high-skilled white collars, and quickly decreases 
to 0% as the observed skill level decreases. The contribution of market imperfections to 
wage dispersion is typically around 50%. 
KEYWORDS: Labor market frictions, wage dispersion, log wage variance decomposition. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WHY DO WAGES DIFFER across identical workers? Why do firm characteristics 
matter? What is the source of the wage dispersion that firm and worker char- 
acteristics cannot explain? To address these basic three questions, we construct 
and estimate an equilibrium model of the labor market with worker- and firm- 
heterogeneous match productivities and on-the-job search. Search frictions are 
indeed a cause of market imperfection, which in theory resolves the three ques- 
tions altogether: Wages differ across firms because search frictions are a source 
1 We are grateful for comments received from conference participants at the "search and matching" 
conference held at the University of Iowa (Aug. 2000), the Econometric Society World Meeting in 
Seattle (Aug. 2000), the "assignment and matching models" conference held at the Tinbergen Insti- 
tute (Dec. 2000), and from seminar participants at Boston University, New York University, Brown, 
Yale, University of Minnesota, University of Wisconsin, Northwestern, CREST, Paris-Jourdan, Uni- 
versite d'Evry, University of Aarhus, Universite Catholique de Louvain, LSE, Oxford, and Univer- 
sity College London. Discussions with Jim Albrecht, Ken Burdett, Melvyn Coles, Chris Flinn, Sam 
Kortum, Francis Kramarz, Dale Mortensen, and Gerard Van den Berg led to significant improve- 
ments in the paper. Special thanks are due to Zvi Eckstein for his numerous and insightful com- 
ments on preliminary versions of this paper. We are also grateful to the journal co-editor and two 
anonymous referees for the outstanding quality and constructiveness of their reports. The customary 
disclaimer naturally applies. 
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of inefficiency, allowing less efficient firms to survive. Search frictions leave mar- 
ket power to employers, whereby more efficient firms extract higher rents. On- 
the-job search forces employers to grant their employees wage raises randomly 
over time, so that wages differ across identical employer-employee pairs. 
In our model, unemployed workers search for a job and employees search 
for a better job. Workers differ in ability and firms differ in the marginal pro- 
ductivity of efficient labor. Workers and firms are imperfectly informed about 
the location of worker and firm types, which precludes optimal assignments as 
in standard marriage models. Yet, when two agents meet, both are immediately 
informed about each other's types. Employers have all the bargaining power and 
offer unemployed workers their reservation wage. The equilibrium nonetheless 
differs from Diamond's monopsony model as search on the job allows employees 
to locate alternative employers, whom they can bring into Bertrand price com- 
petition with their current employer. This competition either results in a wage 
rise or in job mobility, the poaching employer paying the worker a wage that can 
even be less than his/her current wage if the option value of turning down the 
best offer that the current employer can make-the marginal productivity-in 
exchange of a greater potential best offer-the marginal productivity at the new 
job-is large enough. Our model thus not only generates tenure effects but also 
job-to-job mobility with wage cuts. 
The main prediction of the model however pertains to the cross-sectional dis- 
tribution of earnings. We show that log earnings are the sum of a worker-specific 
contribution to match productivity and a firm-specific component that closely 
interacts with a statistical summary of the last wage mobility that the worker 
enjoyed and that typically characterizes the effect of frictions. The worker effect 
is independent of the firm and the friction effects because employers do not sort 
workers by their characteristics thanks to the assumption of perfect substitutabil- 
ity of worker abilities. But it happens that the firm effect and the friction effect 
are not independent as more productive firms have stronger market power and 
thus suffer less from the Bertrand competition. 
We use a rich panel of matched employer-employee data to estimate our model 
semi-nonparametrically. By that we mean that the econometric model is only 
parametric when the theory requires specific parameters (discount rates, job offer 
arrival rates, etc.), and is nonparametric as far as the distributions of firm and 
worker heterogeneities, exogenous to the model, are concerned.2 
Although the three components of the steady-state earnings distribution are 
not independent, we proceed to a decomposition of the variance of earnings into 
three separate components by allocating the total within-firm variance of earn- 
ings that is not explained by worker heterogeneity to market frictions and all the 
between-firm variance to the firm effect. This wage variance decomposition is 
2 The estimation of these distributions and model parameters uses data on spell durations and 
hardly more than a cross-section of the wage data. Most of the dynamic dimension of the wage data 
can then be used for out-of-sample fit analysis. Taking account of the fact that the model features no 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, we conclude that it gives satisfactory predictions of wage variations 
with and without employer change. 
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undoubtedly the main empirical result of this paper. We find that the share of 
the total log wage variance explained by person effects lies around forty percent 
for managers, and quickly drops as the observed skill level decreases. The con- 
tribution of the person effect is estimated to be zero for the three lower-skilled 
worker categories, out of seven categories. Either there is no unobserved ability 
differences for low skilled workers, or some unmodelled institution, like collec- 
tive agreements or minimum wages, forbids the individualization of wages. 
The estimation of a structural equilibrium search model to quantify the con- 
tribution of market frictions to the wage variance is the principal novelty of this 
paper. This contrasts with the work of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999, 
hereafter AKM)3 who estimate a log-wage equation with firm and worker effects 
using the same data but over a different period of time. They find that unmea- 
sured individual heterogeneity accounts for more or less fifty percent of the total 
variance of log wages, while firm heterogeneity accounts for another thirty per- 
cent, the remaining twenty percent being left unexplained. Why is our estimate 
of the person effect so much smaller? We answer: because of labor market fric- 
tions. Endogenous worker mobility through the sequential sampling of alterna- 
tive job offers creates earnings differentials across identical workers working at 
identical firms. A "lucky" or "senior" worker who has gotten one more job offer 
than his "unlucky" or "junior" alter ego has also gotten one extra opportunity to 
bargain for a higher wage. Estimating a static error component model when the 
data generating process is dynamic will therefore attribute all historical differ- 
ences (in the states of individual wage trajectories at the first observation date) 
to person effects. We find that the explanatory power of historical differences is 
far from negligible (forty to sixty percent of total wage variance, depending on 
the skill category). 
Lastly, thanks to the flexibility of the matching technology that we first posit, 
the model has interesting suggestions about the anatomy of the process through 
which workers and firms are matched together. Most empirical equilibrium 
search models make the assumption of random matching by which all firms have 
the same probability of being contacted by job seekers whatever their size.4 Here 
we use firm size data to come up with a measure of the firms' "recruiting effort" 
and find that it is in a decreasing relationship with the firms' productivities: more 
productive firms devote less effort to hiring, which naturally makes them less 
efficient in contacting potential new employees. On the other hand, since they 
generate ceteris paribus higher match surpluses, they are more likely to attract 
the workers that they do contact. Those two opposing forces sum up to a hump- 
shaped relationship between productivity and firm size. 
Having motivated our research and announced our main results, we end the 
introductory part of the paper with a review of the related literature. The rest of 
3See also Abowd and Kramarz (2000), and Abowd, Finer, and Kramarz (1999) for a similar 
descriptive analysis on US data. 
4 See Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) and Mortensen (1998, 1999) for theoretical explorations of 
alternative matching hypotheses. 
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the paper will be divided into five parts: Section 3 details the theoretical model, 
Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 details the structural estimation proce- 
dure, Section 6 reports and discusses the estimation results, and in Section 7, we 
proceed to dynamic simulations. A final section concludes on the successes and 
failures of our model, and points to some ideas to improve on the latter. Proofs 
and technical details are gathered in a final Appendix. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The wage setting mechanism assumed in this paper was already explored in 
an earlier contribution (Postel-Vinay and Robin (1999)) and a somewhat similar 
idea was independently developed by Dey and Flinn (2000). The model discussed 
in the present paper extends this earlier work in many directions. First, instead 
of making the standard assumption (in search models) that workers merely differ 
in their opportunity cost of employment, we also allow them to differ in ability. 
Second, the model exhibits a more flexible matching procedure than is usually 
posited by job search models (random matching). It finally provides an extended 
empirical treatment whereas our earlier paper was primarily focused on the the- 
oretical exploration of the idea of endogenous productivity determination a la 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1997) as a determinant of earnings dispersion. 
The theoretical apparatus that we use mixes Burdett and Mortensen's (1998) 
ideas about on-the-job search with Burdett and Judd's (1983) ideas about instant 
between-firm competition for workers through job offer recall. As was shown by 
Burdett and Judd (1983), marginal productivity payments occur only if workers 
(searching for a job) can simultaneously apply to at least two would-be employ- 
ers. If job offers do not systematically arrive at least in pairs, then equilibrium 
wages are equal to neither marginal productivity nor reservation wages but are 
necessarily dispersed, even among identical workers and firms. Relatedly, Burdett 
and Mortensen (1998) show that dispersion in equilibrium wages occurs with 
sequential search if workers can search on the job. Limited or costly job search 
thus appears to be a self-reinforcing source of wage dispersion. Costly search 
gives firms monopsony power, which in turn motivates the workers' search activ- 
ity because there always remains a hope of finding a better-paying job. 
Structural estimations of equilibrium models of the labor market with double 
productive heterogeneity are rather uncommon. In this field, the contributions 
most commonly cited use the Roy (1951) model of self selection and earnings 
inequality where heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutable workers sort them- 
selves across various sectors requiring sector-specific tasks (e.g., Heckman and 
Sedlacek (1985), Heckman and Scheinkman (1987), and Heckman and Honore 
(1990)). The original Roy model is Walrasian and thus abstracts from labor mar- 
ket frictions. As a result of perfect labor mobility between sectors, it does not 
deliver any observed worker mobility in equilibrium because all workers instanta- 
neously go to their elected sector and stay there forever. This is clearly at odds 
with empirical evidence and again pleads in favor of models like ours that take 
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account of the existing obstacles to labor mobility. Search frictions are incor- 
porated into the Roy model of self selection in a recent paper by Moscarini 
(2000), who mainly focuses on the differences in search strategies across workers. 
Although very promising, this approach still involves too much analytical com- 
plexity to be empirically implementable. Our model has the drawback of treating 
the search strategies as essentially exogenous, its advantage being its ability to 
deliver quantitatively realistic earnings distributions and wage dynamics that can 
be successfully confronted by the data.5 
Finally, a number of equilibrium job search models with heterogeneous work- 
ers and/or firms have been estimated. This literature was initiated by Eckstein and 
Wolpin's (1990) celebrated estimation of the Albrecht and Axell (1984) model. 
Recent additions include the estimation of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) 
model by Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den 
Berg (1999, 2000) (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) for a survey). 
3. THEORY 
In this section we describe a non-Walrasian model of a labor market with 
search frictions that will be brought to the data in the following sections. 
3.1. Setup 
3.1.1. Workers and Firms 
We consider the market for a homogeneous occupation (manual workers, 
administration employees, managers, . . . ) in which a measure M of atomistic 
workers face a continuum of competitive firms, with a mass normalized to 1, that 
produce one unique multi-purpose good. 
Workers face a constant birth/death rate A, and firms live forever. Newborn 
workers begin their working life as unemployed. The unemployment rate of a 
given category of labor is denoted by u. The pool of unemployed workers is 
steadily fueled by layoffs that occur at the exogenous rate 8, and by the constant 
flow ,uM of newborn workers. 
Workers are homogeneous with respect to the set of observable characteristics 
defining their occupation-or equivalently the particular market on which they 
operate-but may differ in their personal "abilities," which are not observed by 
the econometrician. A given worker's ability is measured by the amount ? of 
efficiency units of labor she/he supplies per unit of time. Ability or professional 
efficiency s can be thought of as a function of the individual's human capital. 
However it is not a choice variable and there is no human capital accumula- 
tion over the life-cycle. Newborn workers are assumed to draw their values of ? 
randomly from a distribution with cdf H over the interval [Emin, Emaxl We only 
5 The model proposed by Moscarini only has two types of jobs and therefore cannot deliver quan- 
titatively realistic wage dynamics. Increasing the number of job types, although in principle not par- 
ticularly difficult, has an enormous cost in terms of tractability. 
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consider continuous ability distributions and further denote the corresponding 
density by h.6 
Firms differ in the technologies that they operate. We make the simplifying 
assumption of constant returns to labor. More specifically, we assume that firms 
differ by an exogenous technological parameter p, with cdf F across firms over 
the support [Pmin, pma]. This distribution is assumed continuous with density y. 
The marginal productivity of the match (8, p) of a worker with ability E and a 
firm with technology p is Ep. The total per period output of a type-p firm is 
consequently equal to p times the sum of its employees' abilities. 
A type-E unemployed worker has an income flow of Eb, with b a positive con- 
stant, which he has to forgo from the moment he finds a job. Being unemployed 
is thus equivalent to working at a "virtual" firm of labor productivity equal to b 
that would operate on a frictionless competitive labor market, therefore paying 
each employee her marginal productivity, Eb.7 We think of b as some measure 
of the unemployed workers' "bargaining power." Intuitively, the more produc- 
tive this virtual firm is, the more rent the workers can extract from their future 
matches with "actual" employers. 
Workers discount the future at an exogenous and constant rate p > 0 and seek 
to maximize the expected discounted sum of future utility flows. The instanta- 
neous utility flow enjoyed from a flow of income x is U(x).8 Firms seek to min- 
imize wage costs. 
At this point we should emphasize a fundamental assumption of this model, 
which is that of complete information. In particular, all heterogeneous agent types 
are perfectly observed by everyone in the economy, even though some of them 
are not observable by the econometrician. All wages and job offers are also 
perfectly observed and verifiable. The importance of this assumption will become 
clear when we discuss the wage formation mechanism below. 
3.1.2. Matching 
Firms and workers are brought together pairwise through a (possibly two- 
sided) search process, which takes time, is sequential, and is random. 
Specifically, unemployed workers sample job offers sequentially at a Poisson 
rate AO. As in the original Burdett and Mortensen (1998) paper (hereafter BM), 
employees may also search for a better job while employed. The arrival rate of 
offers to on-the-job searchers is A1. The type p of the firm from which a given 
offer originates is assumed to be randomly selected in [Pmin, Pmax] according to 
6 We fully characterize unobserved individual productive heterogeneity by a scalar index. This is 
a strong restriction that greatly simplifies both theory and estimation. For a recent attempt at con- 
structing an assignment model a la Roy with both search frictions and a bi-dimensional heterogeneity 
of workers, see Moscarini (2000). 
7 The-admittedly restrictive-assumption that a worker's productivities "at home" and at work 
are both proportional to s greatly simplifies the upcoming analysis. 
8 We rule out intertemporal transfers and savings and assume incomplete insurance markets. Risk 
averse individuals who want to smooth consumption over time would want to save and borrow. But 
this is a source of additional complexity with which we cannot yet cope. 
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a sampling distribution with cdf F (and F 1- F) and density f . The sampling 
distribution is the same for all workers irrespective of their ability or employment 
status. 
The common usage in the job search literature is to assume a particular 
"matching technology" that precisely connects the sampling distribution to the 
distribution of firm types. Two extreme benchmark cases are the assumption of 
random matching (all firms have an equal probability of being sampled, implying 
f (p) = y(p); see BM, among others), and that of balanced matching (the proba- 
bility of being sampled is proportional to firm size, implying f (p) = ?(p), where 
?(p) denotes the density of firm types in the population of employed workers; 
see Burdett and Vishwanath (1988).9 We stand somewhere in between those two 
extremes as we assume no a priori connection between the probability density of 
sampling a firm of given type p, f (p), and the density y(p) of such firms in the 
population of firms. 
Assuming that all workers have the same sampling distribution independently 
of their ability and employment status may seem somewhat disputable. A possi- 
ble rationale is that it would go against anti-discrimination regulations for a firm 
to post an offer specifying a range of acceptable values of worker types, except 
for those that have been agreed upon by the collective agreements defining the 
marketed occupation. Our assumption typically rules out the existence of help- 
wanted ads reading "Economist wanted; three-digit-IQed applicants only." How- 
ever, it does not imply that employers do not discriminate between workers since 
we shall assume that employers condition their wage offers on worker character- 
istics. Firms are therefore unable to select workers ex ante, but they can do so 
ex post. 
One may think of the search process as follows: workers go to job agencies and 
take the job offers posted by the highest p firms, because higher p's generate 
higher surpluses (see below). The probability for a given worker to contact a 
firm of a given p thus only depends on the number of ads posted by these 
firms. The sampling weights f (p)/Iy(p) can be interpreted as the average flows 
of ads posted by firms of productivity p per unit of time (or, more loosely as 
their "hiring effort"). This hiring effort is likely to be a decision variable of the 
firms. Yet, we only consider here the partial equilibrium conditional on a given 
distribution of these ratios across firms. We leave these ratios unrestricted and 
provide no theory to endogenize them. We just refer to two recent papers by 
Mortensen (1998, 1999) that bring together the search and matching strands of 
the microeconomic and macroeconomic literature on labor in a way that provides 
foundations for the individual employer/employee match formation process we 
assume here.10 
9 Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) also analyze a form of matching that mixes random matching 
and balanced matching by assuming that workers draw offers either by contacting firms (as under 
random matching) with a given probability, or by contact with employees (as under balanced match- 
ing) with one minus this probability. 
10 Mortensen (1999) also considers another extension of the BM equilibrium search model. Work- 
ers are allowed to choose the effort they put into search according to their current state (unemployed 
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3.1.3. Wage Setting 
We make the following important four assumptions on wage strategies: 
(i) Firms can vary their wage offers according to the characteristics of the 
particular worker they meet. 
(ii) They can counter the offers received by their employees from competing 
firms. 
(iii) Firms make take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to workers. 
(iv) Wage contracts are long-term contracts that can be renegotiated by 
mutual agreement only. 
The first two assumptions are a departure from the standard BM model. They 
naturally arise from the assumption of perfect information about the individual 
characteristics of matching counterparts. This is a disputable assumption. Yet, 
recruitment interviews definitely reveal some information about worker ability. 
Moreover, even in countries like France where strict regulations constrain the 
firms' layoff policies, the labor legislation generally allows for probationary peri- 
ods during which firms are free to let go their hirees at no (or minimal) cost. We 
therefore claim that perfect information is a valid alternative to the blindness of 
interacting agents in the BM model. 
Second, even if information is perfect, there might exist limits to the extent to 
which firms can vary the wage they offer to workers. These limits could be legal 
restrictions like a minimum wage decided by the government or negotiated by 
trade unions. We leave to further work the analysis of the effects of such restric- 
tions on the wage setting mechanism. Although we recognize the importance of 
these effects, analyzing them within the context of a general dynamic equilibrium 
model is a complex problem that we shall not attack here. 
Third, when an employee receives an outside offer of a wage greater than her 
current wage but lower than her marginal productivity, there is no reason why 
her current employer should let her leave the firm although such passive behavior 
is clearly suboptimal.1" Thus combining assumptions (i) and (ii), one sees that 
certain outside offers can be a source of wage increases within the firm for the 
employee who receives them. 
The last two assumptions are more standard. Assumption (iii) imposes that 
workers have no bargaining power (in the sense of a Nash bargaining model). 
It is a restrictive assumption, usual though it may be in the equilibrium search 
literature.12 Assumption (iv) only ensures that a firm cannot unilaterally cancel 
or not) and wage. Assuming a convex search cost results in a job offer arrival rate A1 that is a 
decreasing function of the current wage. This is an interesting extension of the basic model, which 
we do not consider in this paper as it would considerably increase the mathematical complexity of 
the equilibrium. 
11 Firms could nonetheless be willing to avoid moral hazard problems with the rest of their employ- 
ees, for example by committing themselves not to matching outside offers in order to reduce their 
workers' search intensity and turnover. For a preliminary look into this problem, see Postel-Vinay 
and Robin (2001). 
12 In a recent paper, Dey and Flinn (2000) consider a very similar setup in which, in addition, firms 
do not have all the bargaining power. Bringing together Nash bargaining and Bertrand competition 
is certainly a very interesting extension to consider in future work. 
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a promotion obtained by one of its employees after having received an outside 
job offer, once the worker has turned down that offer. It follows that wage cuts 
within the firm are not permitted. In the same line of ideas, note that there is 
no endogenous firing motive on this market because nothing can change in the 
firm's environment that would make a wage contract cease to be profitable to 
the firm if it previously was. 
3.2. Wage Contracts 
We now exploit the preceding series of assumptions to derive the precise values 
of the wage resulting from the various forms of employer-employee contacts. 
The lifetime utility of an unemployed worker of type s is denoted by VO(E) 
and that of the same worker when employed at a firm of type p and paid a wage 
w is V(e, w, p). A type-p firm is able to employ a type-s unemployed worker if 
the match is productive enough to at least compensate the worker for his for- 
gone unemployment income, i.e. sp > sb. Therefore, the lower support of the 
distribution of marginal productivities of labor (mpl), Pmin, has to be no less 
than b, for a firm less productive than b would never attract any worker. When- 
ever that condition is met, any type-p firm will want to hire any type-? unem- 
ployed worker upon "meeting" him on the search market. To this end, the type-p 
firm optimally offers to the type-s unemployed worker the wage f0(s, p) that 
exactly compensates this worker for his opportunity cost of employment, which is 
defined by 
(1) V(e, X0(?, P), P) = Vo(e). 
Because a given employed worker's future employment prospects depend on both 
the type of firm at which he works and his personal ability, the minimum wage 
at which a type-s unemployed worker is willing to work at a given type-p firm 
depends on p and s, as shown by equation (1). 
When a type-p firm's employee receives an outside offer from a type-p' firm, 
both firms enter a Bertrand competition won by the most productive firm. Con- 
sider this sort of auction over a worker s by a firm of productivity p and one of 
productivity p' > p. Since it is willing to extract a positive marginal profit out of 
every match, the best the firm of type p can do for its employee is to set his wage 
exactly equal to sp. The highest level of utility the worker can attain by staying 
at the type-p firm is therefore V(e, sp, p). Accordingly, he accepts to move to 
a potentially better match with a firm of type p' if the latter offers at least the 
wage f(s, p, p') defined by 
(2) V(e, (s, p, p'), p') = V(e, Sp, p)- 
Any less generous offer on the part of the type-p' firm is successfully countered 
by the type-p firm. Now, if p' is less than p, then 0(s, p, p') > sp', in which case 
the type-p' firm will never raise its offer up to this level. Rather, the worker will 
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stay at his current firm, and be promoted to the wage 4(e, p', p) that makes him 
indifferent between staying and joining the type-p' firm. 
The precise value of 4(.) is derived in Appendix A.1 as: 
(3) U()(E, P, P')) = U(EP) - f | F(x)U '(x) dx. 
Note that in comparison to standard search theory, we get an explicit definition 
of 4(e, p, p') from (3) instead of an implicit definition as the solution to an 
integral equation. This will greatly simplify the numerical computations in the 
empirical analysis. 
Expression (3) has some rather intuitive features. The wage paid by firm p' is 
less than the maximal wage firm p can afford to pay, i.e. the marginal productiv- 
ity of the match sp. The difference between the two, measured by the integral 
term in (3) represents the option value of turning down the type-p firm to work 
at the type-p' firm. This option value increases with the productivity difference 
?(p'- p). Workers indeed accept lower wages to work at more productive firms 
because, sp being an upper bound on any wage offer resulting from the compe- 
tition between the incumbent employer p and any challenger p', workers agree 
to trade a lower wage now for increased chances of higher wages tomorrow. It is 
thus more difficult to draw a worker out of a more productive firm, and equiv- 
alently workers are more easily willing to work at more productive firms. The 
option value further positively depends on the frequency of outside offers (A1) 
and the likelihood of high-p draws.'3 Symmetrically, it negatively depends on the 
overall job termination rate 8 + At, which tends to reduce the probability that an 
outside wage offer arrives before the match breaks up. Finally, the amount of 
intertemporal transfer negatively depends on the discount rate and the coeffi- 
cient of relative risk aversion. More myopic and more risk-averse individuals are 
indeed less keen on accepting such risky transfers.14 
Finally, we also show in Appendix A.1, thanks to the assumption that the 
value of nonmarket time Eb has the same form as match productivities, that the 
wage offered by a firm of type p to a type-s unemployed worker is 40(E, p) = 
0(s, b, p). Unemployed workers of all types are thus prepared to work for a wage 
00 that is less than the opportunity cost of employment sb for the same intertem- 
poral arbitrage motive. Moreover, the reservation wage does not depend on the 
arrival rate of offers AO. In conventional search theory, reservations wages do 
depend on AO, because the wage offers are not necessarily equal to the reserva- 
tion wage. A longer search duration may thus increase the value of the eventually 
accepted job. Here, this does not happen: Firms always offer their reservation 
13 For two sampling distributions F, and F2, if F, first-order stochastically dominates F2, then the 
wedge U(sp) - U(O(s, p, p')) is greater for F, than for F2. 
14 These two concepts, time discounting and risk aversion, play a somewhat similar role in this 
model. Less risk averse individuals will have similar trajectories to more risk averse workers if they 
are at the same time more myopic. This conjecture will be corroborated by the empirical analysis 
below. 
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wages to workers. Therefore, there is no gain to expect from rejecting an offer 
and waiting for the following one. 
We end this section by showing the form that equation (3) takes if the utility 
function is of the CRRA type: 
(4) U(x) = l - , (if a > 0, a 0 1), 
Inx (ifa=1), 
where a, the rate of relative risk aversion, is between 0 and +oo. Equation (3) 
then becomes 
(5) In 4(s, p, p') 
ln ? + In 4(1, p, p') 
ln ? ? 1 - ln[pl a- f p F(x)x -dx] (if a > 0, a 7 1), 
ln ? + lnp 
_-,4/f F(X) ?x (if a= 1), 
for any a. In this particular case of CRRA preferences, the model thus natu- 
rally delivers a log-linear decomposition of wages clearly separating the effect 
of ability on one side (ln s) and the effect of labor market history on the other 
(ln 4(1, p, p')). 
3.3. Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility 
The following mobility patterns then naturally emerge from these wage setting 
mechanisms and are rigorously proven in Appendix A.1. Let us first define the 
threshold firm type q(e, w, p) by the equality 
0(s, q(e, w, p), p) = w. 
Given that 4(s, p', p) is an increasing function of p', it follows that 4(s, p', p) < w 
for all p' < q(e, w, p). The value q(e, w, p) is therefore the minimal mpl p' such 
that the Bertrand competition between firm p and firm p' for worker ? raises 
the worker's wage above w. 
Now, consider a worker of type s currently employed by a firm of type p at 
wage w, and let this worker be contacted by a firm of type p'. Only one of the 
following three cases can occur: 
(i) p' < q(e, w, p), and nothing changes. [The worker does not gain any- 
thing from this contact because the type-p incumbent employer could attract the 
worker out of a type-p' firm for a lower wage than w.] 
(ii) p > p' > q(e, w, p), and the worker obtains a wage raise (s, p', p) - w > 0 
from his/her current employer. [The current employer can match any offer of the 
challenging firm and the worker profits from the Bertrand competition between 
p and p' by getting a wage raise in firm p equivalent in present value terms 
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to being paid his marginal productivity sp' in the type-p' firm. Note that it is a 
dominant strategy for the weaker firm p' to challenge firm p. Indeed p' loses 
nothing if p counters and wins the worker if not.] 
(iii) p' > p, and the worker moves to firm p' for a wage 4(e, p, p') that may 
be greater or smaller than w. [Firm p is no match to p' and loses its employee 
to firm p' at a wage that is equivalent to being paid at his previous marginal 
productivity Ep. If p' is large enough the worker may even accept a wage cut to 
move to p' (this happens whenever O(E, p, p') < w).] 
The wage setting mechanism that we assume in this paper delivers interesting 
earnings profiles. First, individual within-firm wage-tenure profiles are nonde- 
creasing and concave in expectation terms. A longer tenure increases the prob- 
ability of receiving a good outside offer. On the other hand, workers with long 
tenures have on average received more offers and consequently earn higher 
wages. They are therefore less likely to receive an attractive offer that would 
result in a promotion.'5 Second, the model can generate firm-to-firm worker 
movements with wage cuts when the tenure profile in the new firm is expected 
to be increasing over a very long time span. 
Comments about the similarities and differences between the wage equation 
generated by our model and a standard human-capital-theory-based wage equa- 
tion can be made at this point to help clarify the discussion. First note that the 
reason for which wages increase with tenure in our model is similar to a standard 
optimal contract type of explanation. In a standard Beckerian story, specific and 
general human capital accumulation by workers makes them increasingly valu- 
able to their employers as their seniority increases (see e.g. Topel (1991)). Since 
general human capital is portable across firms, senior workers also have higher 
alternative wages. It is then optimal for the employers to offer upward sloping 
wage-tenure contracts in order to prevent excessive turnover. Thus in fine, it is 
between-firm competition on the labor market that forces wages to increase with 
tenure. 
In our model firm competition forces employers to grant wage raises to 
their employees through the mechanism of Bertrand competition. Consider the 
sequence of wages a worker of ability s obtains in our model in a same firm with 
mpl p when his/her tenure t varies: they are all of the form of f(E, qt, p). The 
effect of tenure is entirely reflected by the sequence of productivities qt of all 
the less productive employers that the worker was able to bring into competition 
with his/her incumbent employer. 
Over a worker's lifetime, the sequence of p values marks the effect of experi- 
ence as reflected by job-to-job mobility.16 Ultimately then, even though there is 
15 Formally, let w(t) denote the stochastic process (jump process) of wages indexed by tenure 
(conditional on the worker's s and the employer's p). We have 
E[w(t + dt)-w(t)Iw(t) = w, no job mobility] = At dt E[max{(s, p', p)-w, O}Ip' < p]. 
Expected within-firm wage trajectories are therefore continuously increasing and concave as the 
above expression is positive, tends to zero with dt and decreases with w. 
16 This interpretation works up to the fact that, in our model, unemployment acts as a "reset 
button" for experience since falling into unemployment is like going back to a firm with very low 
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no human capital accumulation in our model, workers can gradually find better 
technological support to their innate ability by climbing the ladder of p's, This 
source of wage dispersion is usually neglected in Mincerian models.17 
3.4. Steady-state Equilibrium 
The focal point of this section is the equilibrium distribution of wages, i.e. the 
distribution of wages that can be estimated from a cross-section of individual 
wages. We know from what precedes that an employee of type E of a firm of type 
p is currently paid a wage w that is either equal to 4(s, b, p) if w is the first salary 
after unemployment, or is equal to 4(s, q, p), with p < q < p, if the last wage 
mobility is the outcome of a price competition between the incumbent employer 
and another firm of type q. The cross-sectional distribution of wages therefore 
has three components: a worker fixed effect (s), an employer fixed effect (p), and 
a random effect (q) that characterizes the most recent wage mobility. The aim 
of this section is to determine the joint distribution of these three components. 
In a steady state a fraction u of workers is unemployed and a density ?(e, p) 
of type-s workers is employed at type-p firms. Let e(p) = f'm f(., p) de be 
the density of employees working at type-p firms. The average size of a firm of 
type p is then equal to Me(p)/y(p). We denote the corresponding cdfs with 
capital letters L(s, p) and L(p), and we denote as G(wIs, p) the cdf of the (not 
absolutely continuous, as we shall see) conditional distribution of wages within 
the pool of workers of ability s within type-p firms. 
We now proceed to the derivation of these different distributional parame- 
ters by increasing order of complexity. The steady state assumption implies that 
inflows must balance outflows for all stocks of workers defined by a status (unem- 
ployed or employed), a personal type s, a wage w, an employer type p. The 
relevant flow-balance equations are spelled out in Appendix A.2. They lead to 
the following series of definitions: 
* Unemployment rate: 
(6) u += 
a ? A0 
* Distribution of firm types across employed workers: The fraction of workers 
employed at a firm with mpl less than p is 
(7) L( F) ( p) 
productivity b < Pmin This could still be interpreted as an extreme form of human capital depre- 
ciation caused by the occurrence of an unemployment spell. Moreover, this depreciation could be 
made less extreme by making unemployment income proportional to past wages. 
17 Although we suspect that it would be empirically difficult to tell apart the share of the returns 
to experience due to increasing knowledge from that due to better available technologies without 
precise information on firms' technologies, a promising avenue for future research would be to 
embed explicit human capital accumulation into an equilibrium model of labor market frictions with 
both heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. In this spirit, an extension of our model that 
deserves consideration is one in which individual ability could evolve over time. 
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and the density of workers in firms of type p follows from differentiation as 
(8) f(p) = 1 + K, _ (p)1 
with K1 = Al/(S + /) 
* Within-firm distribution of worker types: The density of matches (?, p) is 
(9) f(s, p) = h(s)t(p). 
* Within-firm distribution of wages: The fraction of employees of ability ? in 
firms with mpl p is 
/10) G1 + KjF(p) 2 1 + K,L[q(8, w, p)] 2 (10) Gwis, x 1+ KlF[q(8, w, p)] 1k 1+ K,L(p) 2 
Equation (6) is standard in equilibrium search models (see BM) and merely 
relates the unemployment rate to unemployment in- and outflows. 
Equation (7) is a particularly important empirical relationship as it will allow 
us to back out the sampling distribution F from its empirical counterpart L.18 
Steady-state equilibrium conditions thus provide structural solutions to standard 
selectivity problems in empirical models of the labor market, as they relate the 
distribution of unobservables to that of observables. They allow for nonparamet- 
ric analyses when standard models for censored data rest on strong parametric 
or semiparametric, more or less ad hoc, assumptions. 
The equilibrium average size of a firm of productivity p is Mf(p)/y(p). Equa- 
tion (8) implies that it is the product of two terms: 
(11) MEm(p) M(1+ K1) f(p) 
y(p) [1+K1F(p)]2 y(p) 
The first term in the right-hand-side multiplication, M(1 + K1)/[1 + K1F(p)]2, 
increases with p, meaning that the higher p, the easier it is for a firm to win the 
Bertrand game: high-productivity firms have more market power and should be 
thus bigger. The second term, f (p)/y(p), is the hiring effort of a firm of type 
p. The way hiring effort varies with p is unspecified by the model, but one easily 
imagines that convex hiring cost could make it a decreasing function of p. The 
model therefore does not constrain firm sizes to be necessarily increasing with 
firm productivities as it would be the case with random matching (f (p) = y(p)). 
Nor does the most productive firm p necessarily drain the whole workforce, as 
would be implied by balanced matching (f(p) = ?(p) forces F(p) = 1). 
Equation (9) implies that, under the model's assumptions, the within-firm dis- 
tribution of individual heterogeneity is independent of firm types. Nothing thus 
prevents the formation of highly dissimilar pairs (low s, high p, or low p, high s) 
18 It is exactly the same equilibrium relationship as between the distribution of wage offers and the 
distribution of earnings in the BM model. 
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if profitable to both the firm and the worker. This results from the assumptions 
of constant returns to scale, scalar heterogeneity, and undirected search. Given 
that all operating firms have p > b and since it never happens that p beats p' for 
some s's and p' beats p for some others, all possible matches generate a positive 
surplus and there will always exist a wage acceptable for every worker-firm pair. 
This result doesn't rule out assortative matching of workers and firms in a 
general sense: remember that we are considering a labor market for one partic- 
ular occupation. Going back to the labor market as a whole, it may very well be 
the case that the within firm distributions of the marketed professions vary sig- 
nificantly across firms. Our model merely predicts the absence of sorting within 
occupations.19 
Finally, equation (10) expresses the conditional cdf of wages in the population 
of type-8 workers hired by a type-p firm. What the pair of equations (9, 10) 
shows is that a random draw from the steady-state equilibrium distribution of 
wages is a value 4(s, q, p) where (e, p, q) are three random variables such that: 
(i) s is independent of (p, q), 
(ii) the cdf of the marginal distribution of s is H over [Emin, ?max], 
(iii) the cdf of the marginal distribution of p is L over [pminlPmai' and (iv) the cdf of the conditional distribution of q given p is G(. lp) over {b} U 
[Pmin, P] such that 
G(qlp) G(4(s, q, p)|E, p) 
[1 + K,F(p)]2 
[1+ K1F(q)]2 
for all q E {b} U [Pmin, p]. The latter distribution has a mass point at b and is 
otherwise continuous over the interval [Pmin, P]. 
An interesting feature of the steady-state distribution of the triple (?, q, p) is 
that it does not depend on the form of the utility function. 
3.5. Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance 
Our goal in this final section of the theory part of the paper is to use what we 
have so far learned from the model about the distribution of wages to provide a 
fully interpretable decomposition of the cross-worker variance of (log) wages. 
19 This result finds some empirical support. The somewhat limited available evidence about the 
correlation between worker and firm productive heterogeneity components indeed shows that the 
degree of sorting is in any case small, controlling for observed worker heterogeneity. AKM estimate 
a correlation between firm and worker effects of 0.08 in the French DADS panel (order-dependent 
estimation of the correlation between a and 4 in Table VI), and Abowd, Finer, Kramarz (1999) 
find essentially 0 using the Washington State Ul data. This result has recently been updated by 
Abowd and Kramarz (2000) who find that this overall absence of correlation between person and 
firm effects results from the addition of two opposite effects which cancel each other out: person 
effects and industry effects are positively correlated between industries but negatively correlated 
within industries. 
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We showed in the preceding section that all wages were particular realizations 
of a random variable 4(8, q, p), with (?, q, p), drawn as indicated at the end 
of Section 3.4. We also showed that, provided that the utility function is of the 
CRRA form (4), wages are proportional to worker types (equation (5)). The 
following identities immediately follow from those considerations: 
E(lnwlp) = Elns+E[ln40(1, q, p)lp], 
V(ln wlp) = V ln s + V[ln b(1, q, p)Ip], 
where the expectations and variances are taken with respect to the relevant 
steady-state equilibrium distributions, as described in Section 3.4. A natural 
decomposition of the total variance of log wages thus arises from our model as 
follows: 
(12) Vlnw=EV(lnwlp)+ VE(lnwjp) 
= Vlns + VE(lnwlp) + (EV(lnwlp) - Vlns) 
= Vlns +VE[ln4(1,q,p)1p] +EV[lnq(1,q,p)jp]. 
Person effect Firm effect Effect of market frictions 
The first term (V ln s) in this decomposition is obviously interpreted as the con- 
tribution of dispersion in unobserved individual ability. We shall therefore refer 
to it as the "person effect." The second term (VE(ln wjp)) is the between-firm 
wage variance. It reflects the fact that some firms pay higher wages on average 
and thus contribute to individual wage dispersion. Even though this is admittedly 
abusive since q and p are not independent, it is also quite natural to label this 
term the "firm effect." The third term (EV(ln wIp) - V ln s) is the share of the 
within-firm wage variance which is not due to dispersion in individual ability. Its 
origin is clearly identified in the model: the reason why two workers of identical 
types working at identical firms can earn different wages is that the two work- 
ers had different draws of alternative wage offers. This particular source of wage 
dispersion is therefore the fact that firms compete to attract workers on a fric- 
tional labor market. Hence the name "effect of market frictions" that we give to 
the corresponding term in our log-wage variance decomposition. 
4. DATA 
4.1. The DADS Panel 
The De'clarations Annuelles des Donne'es Sociales dataset is a large collection 
of matched employer-employee informations collected by the French Statistical 
Institute INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques- 
Division des Revenues). The data are based on mandatory employer reports of 
the earnings of each salaried employee of the private sector subject to French 
payroll taxes over one given year. (See AKM for a complete description of the 
DADS data.) Each yearly observation includes an identifier that corresponds to 
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the employee and an identifier that corresponds to the establishment. We also 
have information on the timing in days of the individual's employment spell at 
the establishment, as well as the number of hours worked during that spell. Each 
observation also includes, in addition to the variables listed above, the sex, month, 
year, and place of birth, occupation, total net nominal earnings over the year, 
and annualized gross nominal earnings over the year for the individual, as well 
as the location-region, departement ("district"), and town-and industry of the 
employing establishment. There is no information on education in the data, and 
the Census data used by AKM to get information on educational attainments are 
pretty useless in our case because the last available Census dates back to 1990 
and many of the workers active during the 1990's were still at school in 1990. 
To reduce the sample size, we use data for the region Ile-de-France (greater 
Paris) only.20 Moreover, we restrict the panel to the period 1996-1998, our last 
available survey. We have deliberately selected a much shorter period than is 
available because we want to find out whether it is possible to estimate our 
structural model over a homogeneous period of the business cycle. It would have 
been very hard indeed to defend the assumption of time-invariant parameters 
(the job offer arrival rate parameters in particular) had we been using a longer 
panel. 
Moreover, to enhance the precision of the empirical moments (means, vari- 
ances) of the within-firm earnings distribution that will be needed in the estima- 
tion, we select only those workers employed at firms of size no smaller than five 
employees. We shall comment on this selection later in the paper. 
Ideally, one would want to follow all the trajectories of all individuals employed 
by firms of size greater than 5 and operating in Ile-de-France in 1996 over the 
three-year period 1996-1998. However, for confidentiality reasons, INSEE pro- 
vides individual identifiers only for the subsample of individuals who were born 
in October of even-numbered years. The 1996-1998 panel that we shall use is 
therefore an exogenous selection of all available individual trajectories (about 
1/20th). Note, however, that the exhaustive individual declarations are available, 
only without the individual identifiers. This is still useful to compute the exact 
distribution of wages within each establishment. Note that, because of attrition 
(workers retiring, or starting their own business, or becoming unemployed, or 
going to the public sector), only the initial cross-section forms a representative 
sample. 
We construct seven datasets corresponding to seven different occupational 
categories: (i) executives, managers and engineers, (ii) administrative and sales 
supervisors, (iii) technical supervisors and technicians, (iv) administrative staff, 
(v) skilled manual workers, (vi) sales and service employees, and (vii) unskilled 
manual workers. Each observation specifies the following information col- 
lected from the employers' yearly records: (i) the individual's identifier, (ii) the 
employer's identifier, (iii) the year, (iv) yearly earnings, (v) the number (between 
20 The region is Ile-de-France, and it comprises 8 departements (Paris, Seine et Marne, Yvelines, 
Essonne, Hauts de Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val de Marne, Val d'Oise). 
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1 and 360) of the day when the record starts, (vi) the number of the day when it 
ends, and (vii) the number of hours worked in year (iii) by (i) in (ii) between day 
(v) and day (vi). By sorting the data by columns (i), (ii), (v), and (vi), one can 
thus construct a panel of individual trajectories. Note that there can exist several 
records for one single worker in one given year if the individual has changed 
employer several times in that year. Lastly, the wage variable that we shall use 
in the empirical analysis is the hourly wage rate. 
Compared to a standard panel (NLSY, PSID, ...) the DADS panel keeps 
track of the employing establishment. This peculiarity allowed AKM to estimate 
an error component model with a double index (individual x establishment), and 
made possible a decomposition of log wages into three components: an individual 
component, a component for each establishment, and a residual term. 
4.2. Descriptive Analysis of the Data 
We start the descriptive analysis with a look at worker mobility patterns. The 
panel sample indicates for example that worker i was employed at establishment 
j during d days in 1996 within a time interval beginning this day of 1996 and 
ending that day of 1996. A trajectory featuring an employer change may be such 
that the end of one employment spell does not coincide with the beginning of the 
next one, and a worker may also leave the panel before the end of the recording 
period. There is no way of knowing the status of the worker during such periods 
not covered by a wage statement. He/she may have permanently or temporarily 
quit participating, or be unemployed, or have found a job in the public sector, 
or have started up his/her own business. In the estimation, we shall interpret 
temporary attrition as resulting from layoffs and permanent attrition as resulting 
from either layoffs or retirements. Moreover, we arbitrarily define a job-to-job 
mobility as an employer change with an intervening unemployment spell of less 
than 15 days. 
Table I reports some statistics about worker mobility. It shows that, depend- 
ing on the occupational category, 42 to 55 per cent of the workers stayed in 
the same job over the entire recording period of 3 years, while only 5 to 23 per 
cent changed jobs without passing through a period of unemployment. Job-to-job 
mobility therefore appears to be rather limited in this period, which corresponds 
to the end of a recession, in spite of the fact that job-to-job mobility (and worker 
mobility in general) is usually found much more substantial around Paris than 
in the rest of France. Concerning the mobility between employment and nonem- 
ployment, the sample mean employment duration (which is censored at 3 years) 
is close to 2 years for all worker categories, while the median of that same dura- 
tion (not reported here) is above 3 years for all categories. The sample mean 
21 The least-squares estimation of AKM requires many years of observations as the individual and 
firm fixed effects are identified only from mobility. Over the 1976-1987 period of their observation 
sample, 90% of individuals change employers 3 times or less. A three-year panel would therefore 
yield very imprecise estimates. 
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TABLE I 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF WORKER MOBILITY 
Percentage whose first 
Number Percentage with recorded mobility is from job... Sample mean Sample mean 
of indiv. no recorded ... to-out unemployment employment 
Occupation trajectories mobility (%) ... to-job (%) of sample (%) spell duration spell duration 
Executives, managers, 22,757 46.2 23.4 30.4 0.96 yrs 2.09 yrs 
and engineers 
Supervisors, administrative, 14,977 48.1 19.3 32.5 1.16 yrs 2.11 yrs 
and sales 
Technical supervisors 7,448 55.5 16.0 28.6 1.07 yrs 2.28 yrs 
and technicians 
Administrative support 14,903 54.3 8.2 37.5 1.30 yrs 2.23 yrs 
Skilled manual workers 12,557 55.9 5.2 38.9 1.16 yrs 2.28 yrs 
Sales and service workers 5,926 45.1 5.5 49.4 1.28 yrs 2.06 yrs 
Unskilled manual workers 4,416 42.5 7.0 50.5 1.29 yrs 1.98 yrs 
duration of nonemployment lies between 12 and 14 months, while its median 
(not reported here) is close to one year for all categories. 
To reassure ourselves that it is legitimate to consider the sole region Ile-de- 
France as a self-contained labor market, we can look at cross-regional worker 
mobility. Looking at the sequence of employer locations for all workers in the 
panel, we find that only 4.7 percent of them leave Ile-de-France during the record- 
ing period. Cross-regional mobility is therefore extremely limited over the period 
considered, and we can safely ignore it. 
Finally, we may want to look at the stability of our occupational categorization 
of workers. We use the loosest available classification (next to pooling all work- 
ers together in a single class), which contains 7 categories (see above). It turns 
out that in total 81.3 per cent of the workers do not change category over the 
recording period, and close to 4 per cent change twice or more. A more detailed 
look at those mobility patterns shows that the mobility is notably due to skilled 
white collars becoming executives, and unskilled blue collars becoming skilled 
blue collars. 
We now turn to a description of wage mobility. Table II displays some infor- 
mation about the wage changes experienced by workers after their first recorded 
job-to-job mobility. The nominal wages available in the data were deflated using 
the Consumer Price Index (+1.23% in 1996 and +0.7% in 1997). The reported 
statistics include medians and 5 selected quantiles of the distribution of wage 
changes in the relevant population of workers. We see on that table that, even 
though the median wage variation after a job-to-job mobility is practically always 
positive, between 36 and 55 per cent of workers changing jobs do it at the price of 
a wage decrease. This observation confirms our initial feeling that it was impor- 
tant to model a wage setting mechanism allowing for such wage cuts due to job 
changes. 
Table III reports similar information about the wage changes experienced 
between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 1997 for workers who held the same 
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TABLE II 
VARIATION IN REAL WAGE AFTER FIRST RECORDED JOB-TO-JOB MOBILITY 
(I.E. WITH LESS THAN 15 DAYS WORK INTERRUPTION) IN 96-98 
Median % obs. such that A log wage < 
Occupation Nb. obs. Alog wage (%) -0.10 -0.05 0 0.05 0.10 
Executives, managers, and engineers 5,335 3.1 23.6 28.5 38.1 55.1 65.4 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales 2,893 3.7 21.6 27.1 36.6 54.3 65.2 
Technical supervisors and technicians 1,190 3.8 14.0 20.2 32.2 55.5 67.3 
Administrative support 1,222 2.2 21.5 28.7 40.7 60.5 69.2 
Skilled manual workers 657 0.5 33.2 37.7 49.2 62.3 72.0 
Sales and service workers 326 1.4 31.3 37.7 45.1 58.0 67.5 
Unskilled manual workers 310 -1.3 33.5 42.9 54.5 63.4 72.3 
job over this period. Indeed, we have several wages recorded for the same indi- 
vidual in the same firm-establishment if the worker stays employed by one firm 
for more than one year. Unfortunately, there is no way to know exactly at which 
moment he/she experienced a wage increase if the daily wage reported one year 
is greater than the one reported the year before. As the table shows, it frequently 
happens (around 30 per cent of the times, depending on worker categories) that 
real wages decrease from one year to the next even when the worker has not 
changed employers. Obviously, our model cannot deliver such downward wage 
changes. They may reflect fluctuations of bonuses with the firm's activity since 
there is no way of separating contractual wages from bonuses, which in some 
cases may be a nonnegligible share of remunerations. Wage changes may also 
reflect occupation changes within the same establishment and compensating dif- 
ferentials. These wage fluctuations could be captured in the model in an ad hoc 
way by a pure idiosyncratic shock. Nevertheless, we prefer to estimate the struc- 
tural model as it was laid out in the preceding sections at the price of a lack of 
fit because our main goal here is precisely to evaluate the ability of the struc- 
tural model to reproduce the main features of the dynamics of wages. Incorpo- 
rating productivity fluctuations into the model is certainly not a straightforward 
TABLE III 
VARIATION IN REAL WAGE BETWEEN 01/01/96 AND 31/12/97 WHEN HOLDING 
THE SAME JOB OVER THIS PERIOD 
Median % obs. such that A log wage < 
Occupation Nb. obs. Alog wage (%) -0.10 -0.05 0 0.05 0.10 
Executives, managers, and engineers 16,102 2.7 6.6 11.3 28.5 64.4 80.0 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales 15,592 2.6 7.9 12.9 28.6 65.2 81.1 
Technical supervisors and technicians 5,644 2.5 6.6 11.9 29.6 68.1 85.0 
Administrative support 11,105 2.2 7.9 12.4 30.0 69.8 84.2 
Skilled manual workers 9,747 1.9 7.9 15.0 34.9 69.5 85.1 
Sales and service workers 4,192 2.5 7.4 12.8 31.4 64.5 79.1 
Unskilled manual workers 2,847 2.2 7.7 14.6 32.9 66.4 81.9 
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extension, as we know that it generates endogenous job destruction (see e.g. 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). 
5. ESTIMATION METHOD 
The aim of this section is to show how the data we have just described can 
be used with a given specification of the utility function U(.) to provide non- 
parametric estimates of the distributions of individual abilities and firm marginal 
labor productivities, together with the other one-dimensional parameters of the 
model, namely the transition rates 8, ,u, AO, A1, and the discount rate p. 
We shall restrict our attention to utility functions of the CRRA form (4) and 
normalize EU(E) to 0.22 As we saw in the theory part, this specification allows 
for a multiplicative separation of individual and firm effects within the wage 
function: 4O(, q, p) = E4(1, q, p). 
The discrete nature of the data, the fact that all individual wage records are 
aggregated within each calendar year, implies a complicated censoring of the 
continuous-time trajectories generated by the theoretical model. Maximum like- 
lihood therefore fails as a potential candidate for an estimation method. We 
develop an alternative multi-step estimation procedure in the spirit of that pro- 
posed by Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) to estimate the BM model. 
The estimation procedure separates the parameters that can be estimated from 
a cross-section of wages (the heterogeneity distributions) from the parameters 
requiring transition data for identification (the transition rates AO, A1, 8, and ,u). 
We prefer the multi-step estimation method to a more efficient, one-step, full- 
information estimation method even in a parametric context, because it allows 
better control of which data are used to identify and estimate which parameter. 
We know indeed that full-information estimation guarantees efficiency only if the 
model is correctly specified, but can be a source of considerable bias otherwise.23 
5.1. Notation 
The previously described 96-98 DADS panel is a set {(wit, fi, D?, Di`), i = 
1, ... , N, t = 1, . . . , Ti}, where i indexes workers and t indexes administrative 
records, i.e. wit is the real wage rate paid by employer ftt E {1,. . . , M} to worker 
iE {1,. . , N} during the time interval [DO, D' ] (with Do, DXE{1,..., 3 x 360} 
in daily time units) covered by the tth administrative record. Note that there 
may exist more than one record in the same year of observation. The number of 
22 That is: EU(s) = f U(s)h(s) d? = 0, implying that E,1-a = 1. 
-,min 23 For example, the transition parameter A1 contributes to the distributions of both durations and 
cross-sectional wages. Suppose that the theoretical restrictions on the form of the earnings distribu- 
tion fails to fit the data well. Then a full-information estimation method could use the parameter A1 
to improve the fit of the model's earnings distribution with the data at the cost of a reduced fit with 
the duration data. This is why we prefer to identify A1 from duration data and impose it afterwards 
in the estimation of the parameters that are specific to the wage distribution. 
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observations per worker, Ti, may thus vary across workers depending on attrition 
(interrupted records such that D? 1 > Dt + 15 for some t) or mobility (more 
than one employment spell in the same year: D' t?1-D?< 360 for some t). There 
are as many datasets as we distinguish occupational categories (seven). For the 
sake of notational simplicity we do not index observations by the corresponding 
occupation. 
The subsample {(wil, f1l, Do, Dil), i = 1, . . . , N} is exhaustive of all employed 
workers in the Paris region working at firms of size at least equal to five, but the 
variables (Wit, ftt, DO, D 1 ) for t > 1 are missing for about 19 out of 20 randomly 
selected workers. 
To circumvent the difficulty of describing the time aggregation process implied 
by the raw data, we limit our estimation sample to the set {(wi, , d1i, vi, d2i); i- 
1,. . , N}, where: 
(i) wi =wi1, f_ fil are the wage and firm identifier characterizing the first 
record for individual i (at least one exists), 
(ii) dli is the length of the uninterrupted time span over which worker i is 
observed working at firm fi, which we compute as 
Ti 
dli = D' - Do + E I{ft = fi, Dot < Dil t_1 + 15} x (D' -DO?) 
t=2 
(1{ } is the indicator function), 
(iii) vi is 1 or 0 depending on whether or not the declared wages are equal 
in all records covered by the first employment spell of length d1l (it thus indi- 
cates whether the worker has received zero or at least one wage raise during his 
employment period at firm fi), and 
(iv) d2i is the time spent out of the sample before a possible re-entry. 
The wage observations that are not used for the estimation will be used subse- 
quently to assess the ability of the estimated model to reproduce individual wage 
dynamics. 
Finally, let Ij denote the set of identifiers of the workers employed at any 
firm j, j = 1, . . . , M. We denote by yj the mean earnings utility of employees 
of firm j: yj = (1/#Ij) Ei,j JU(wi), where #Ij is the cardinal of set Ij (i.e. the 
size of firm j), and as pj the unobserved mpl of firm j. We also denote as si the 
unobserved ability of worker i. 
5.2. Identifying Assumptions 
In addition to all the assumptions already explicitly or implicitly stated in the 
theory, the estimation procedure rests on the following identifying assumptions: 
IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTION 1: The set {wi, i = 1, . . . , N} is a set of N inde- 
pendent draws from the steady-state equilibrium wage distribution. 
This first assumption is relatively innocuous. It amounts to assuming that a 
cross-section of yearly earnings is a good approximation of a cross-section of 
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instantaneous earnings rates. It neglects all wage changes within one year that 
are not recorded in the administrative data. 
IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTION 2: At the theoretical steady-state, the conditional 
mean earnings utility y(p) _ E[U(w) Ip] is a strictly increasing function of the firm's 
mpl p. 
The second assumption is restrictive but likely to be true. In order to identify 
the unobserved mpl pj for each firm j, without a long enough panel of wages 
to estimate firm effects from mobile workers,24 we need to rely on the assump- 
tion that there exists a moment of the within-firm wage distribution that is in 
a one-to-one relationship with p. What is more arbitrary is the choice of which 
moment to use. There are two obvious choices: firm size and firm mean earn- 
ings utility (mean wage or mean log wage). We discard the first choice because 
the theoretical value of the steady-state size of a firm with productivity p is a 
function of the sampling weight f (p)/ly(p) which, in the absence of any convinc- 
ing theory of matching, need not be a monotonic function of productivity (see 
below Section 6.7). Mean earnings utilities per firm appears as a better choice, if 
only because the average wage per firm would be the OLS estimate of the firm 
effect in a wage equation with firm unobserved heterogeneity. It thus seems nat- 
ural to use this estimator to retrieve the structural firm heterogeneity variable. 
For this empirical strategy to work, within-firm mean earnings utility must be a 
monotonic function of the firm mpl p. 
In Appendix A.3 we derive the steady-state equilibrium conditional expectation 
of any function T(w) of the wage paid by a firm of type p to any of its employees 
taken at random. Clearly, the simplest formula is obtained for T(w) = U(w), in 
which case one has:25 
(13) E[U(w)lp] = U(p) - [1 + K1F(p)]2 l (1-K)K1F(q) U'(q) dq, 
where o- = p/(p +8 + /i). The function y(p) = E[U(w) Ip] is locally increasing at 
p if and only if 
y'(p) = -(1 -o-)KjF(p)U'(p) + 2K4f(p)[1? + KF(p)] 
fP 1 + (1- u)K,F(q) U'(q)d 0 
'b [1 +K,F(q)]2 
24 We are definitely not yet capable of estimating our structural model using a long panel like AKM 
or Abowd and Kramarz (2000). Remember that they assume a simple static, linear error component 
model and they already face huge numerical difficulties. Adding nonlinearities and dynamics, as in 
our model, is beyond reach for the time being. 
25 In the sequel, all mathematical expectation signs refer to the steady-state equilibrium distribution 
derived in the theoretical section. 
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If there is a nonmonotonicity problem, it can thus only occur at the left end of 
the support of p (the negative contribution to the positivity of the derivative is 
proportional to a decreasing function of p: F(p)U'(p)). In particular, for Pmin, 
Y (Pmin) > ? E<~ f (Pmin) > 21 (1 --)K1 U'(Pmin) > 0 ~ ~ 2 1 + (1 - O-)K1 U(Pmin) - U(b)' 
which implies that the left tail of the sampling distribution of p must not be too 
thin. It will hold true if workers are sufficiently myopic (o- large), or if U(Pmin) - 
U(b) is large enough, or if on-the-job turnover is limited (K1 small). Note that 
in particular, under this identifying assumption, Pmin is strictly greater than b. 
IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTION 3: There are no sampling errors in the computation 
of within-firm mean earnings utilities y1. 
The third identifying assumption, together with Identifying Assumption 1, 
means that the empirical measure y, is exactly equal to the theoretical condi- 
tional expectation of individual earnings utilities within firm j: yj = y(pj). Firms 
with greater observed values of mean earnings utilities must also have greater 
productivity values, and firms with close values of mean earnings utility must also 
have close productivity values. Identifying Assumption 2 then allows identifica- 
tion of pj from yj by inverting function y(.). We denote p(.) = y-1 ) 
How acceptable is Identifying Assumption 3? Sampling errors are related to 
firm sizes #Ij and within-firm wage dispersions. The greater the size, the smaller 
the error. But the distribution of firm sizes is highly concentrated in the region of 
small sizes (but still displays very long tails). Therefore, the existence of sampling 
errors is something that should be taken care of. Unfortunately, our nonparamet- 
ric estimation method cannot cope with an additional measurement or sampling 
error to be added to the three theoretical stochastic components of wages (per- 
son, firm, and friction effects). To limit the sampling errors, we only retain the 
firms of size greater than five in our sample.26 A more severe trimming (more 
than ten, twenty.... ) does not change the results very much, as opposed to any 
less severe selection (more than two for example). Firm size greater than five 
thus seems a good compromise.27 
26 Dropping wage observations for employees of establishments employing strictly less than five 
workers of the same occupation trimmed 18% of individual wage observations for higher managers 
and engineers, 26% for lower managers, 24% for technicians, 25% for administrative employees, 
40% for sales and service workers, 29% for skilled blue collars, and 32% for unskilled blue collars. 
The selection on establishments is quite considerable since about 83%-88% of all establishments, 
depending on the occupation, are thus withdrawn from the estimation sample. As usual, the fact that 
most establishments employ a very small number of workers is hard to cope with using our models 
where firms are continuous sets of workers. 
27 In comparison, notice that AKM also estimate the fixed effects by least-square methods that 
are only asymptotically consistent. Moreover, the fixed effects are only estimated for mobile workers, 
which therefore implies an endogenous selection similar to the one to which we proceed. Lastly, in 
the ten-year panel that they use, only 8% of the workers have changed employers strictly more than 
three times and 19% strictly more than twice (see Table 1 in AKM, p, 267). The individual fixed 
effects are therefore very imprecisely estimated. 
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5.3. Outline of the Estimation Method 
To preserve the paper's readability, we confine the full description of the some- 
what complex estimation procedure to Appendix B. Here we only describe its 
main logic, which goes through the following stages: 
(i) We first estimate the transition parameters 8, ,u, AO. and A1 by maximizing 
the likelihood of individual observations (d1i, 6, d2i), i = 1, .. ., N, conditional 
on the mean earnings utilities Yf, within firms fi. In writing this conditional likeli- 
hood function, we use equation (7) to replace anywhere it is needed the sampling 
cdf F(pf.) by 
F(p(yf.)) = (1 + Kj) L(p(yf.)) 1 + K,L(p(yf.) 
where L(p(yf.)) Z(yf.) is the cdf of the distribution of firms' yj's across work- 
ers, which can be nonparametrically and consistently estimated using the cross 
section of matched employer-employee data {(wi, f ), i = 1, . . . , N}. 
(ii) Next, we use the identifying restriction on mean earnings utilities and pro- 
ductivities: yj = y(pj), to obtain a semiparametric estimate of pj given yj by 
inverting the theoretical function p - y(p) = E[U(w)lp]. Note that the com- 
putation of y(p) requires a value of the workers' discount rate p. Now, remem- 
ber that the discount rate conditions the option value component of the wage 
function O(E, q, p), and is, as such, a determinant of within-firm wage disper- 
sion. It is thus also estimated at this stage, together with the cross-sectional vari- 
ance of individual abilities transformed by U, VU(si), by fitting within-firm mean 
squared earnings utilities, ( j/#Ij) EiE,j U(Wi)2, with their theoretical counter- 
parts, E[U(w)21p = pj]' for all firms j. 
(iii) Finally, the theory implies that each wage wi in the cross-section is such 
that ln wi = ln i +?ln 0k(1, qi, Pf), where the person effect Ei is independent of the 
firm effect Pf, and the friction effect qi, with qi distributed given Pf, as indicated 
in Section 3.4. The preceding steps allow estimation of the equilibrium distribu- 
tion of qi given Pfi, and thus the distribution of the term ln (1, qi,Pf) in the 
convolution equation. We then use the deconvolution method of Stefanski and 
Caroll (1990) to estimate nonparametrically (up to the scalar parameters of the 
theory) the distribution of individual log abilities lnEi. In passing, we also pro- 
vide an estimate of the variance of person effects, which allows implementation 
of the variance decomposition described in Section 3.5. 
Each stage uses the results of the preceding one. Estimation errors are thus 
passed on from one step to the next but the complexity of the whole procedure 
renders the computation of appropriate standard errors intractable. Fortunately, 
the huge sizes of the samples we use for inference legitimate the claim that 
neither efficiency nor asymptotic standard errors are a problem about which we 
have to worry. In any case, goodness-of-fit analyses will be conducted to assess 
the ability of the thus obtained model calibration to reproduce the main features 
of the data. 
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6. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We implemented the above estimation method under two alternative spec- 
ifications of the utility function: logarithmic (a = 1, U(w) = ln w), and linear 
(a = 0, U(w) = w - 1). As the risk aversion parameter a is the only parameter 
that we do not estimate, we use a comparison of the estimation results under the 
two alternative specifications to assess the robustness of those results.28 
6.1. Transition Rates 
We first report the estimated transition parameters in Table IV As explained 
in the previous section, those parameters are estimated using observed employ- 
ment and unemployment spell lengths and the observed within-firm mean utili- 
ties. As the rankings of firms with respect to mean utilities are the same under 
our two alternative specifications of the utility function, the estimated transition 
parameters are independent of the particular specification retained. The values 
reported in Table IV therefore apply under either specification. 
Layoffs and reemployment rates vary with skills as expected. Layoffs occur 
on average every 10 to 15 years and unemployment lasts between 6-8 months. 
Attrition is a rare event (once every 65 years for unskilled blue collars who 
display the highest rate!). Surprisingly, the arrival rate of alternative offers varies 
relatively little with the worker category. On an average, employees are solicited 
by "poachers" every 16-19 months. 
6.2. Productivity Estimates 
The estimated logged marginal labor productivities pj are plotted on 
Figure 1 against the corresponding values of within-firm mean utilities yj = 
(1/#Ij) EiE,j U(wi) (mean log wage).29 The vertical lines indicate the 10th, 25th, 
50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the distribution Z of employers' observed yf 
in the population of employees. Estimates of U(Pmin) and U(b) are given in the 
first two columns of Table V Our initial assumption that b is always less than 
Pm.in, which implies that any type of firm can potentially hire any type of worker, 
holds true in the data. 
We first check that labor productivity is an increasing function of per-firm 
mean earnings utility. Then looking at how the 45-degree line divides the area 
below the productivity curve, one sees that the profit share of value-added is 
generally not a monotonic function of labor productivity, except for the lower- 
skilled categories of labor. Finally, the slope of the productivity curve is extremely 
steep at the right tail of the distribution. This happens because mean wages are 
28 Our programs work for any nonnegative value of a. We ran the estimations for several values, 
and found that the comparison of a = 0 and a = 1 was illustrative enough of the impact of changing 
a. The programs are available upon request. 
29 We only show the case of U(w) = ln w to save on space. The figure for the case U(w) = w is 
similar and is available in the working paper version available on our web pages. 
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TABLE IV 
ESTIMATED TRANSITION PARAMETERS 
Parameter 
Occupation , Ao Al K1 
Executives, managers, and engineers 0.0776 0.0070 2.104 0.643 7.61 
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.063) (0.009) (0.14) 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales 0.0859 0.0065 1.956 0.666 7.21 
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.081) (0.015) (0.21) 
Technical supervisors and technicians 0.0686 0.0042 2.055 0.646 8.87 
(0.0016) (0.0008) (0.137) (0.021) (0.37) 
Administrative support 0.0932 0.0085 1.678 0.737 7.24 
(0.0020) (0.0011) (0.078) (0.026) (0.32) 
Skilled manual workers 0.0886 0.0082 1.499 0.685 7.07 
(0.0020) (0.0012) (0.071) (0.027) (0.35) 
Sales and service workers 0.1016 0.0045 1.486 0.716 6.75 
(0.0031) (0.0016) (0.097) (0.038) (0.44) 
Unskilled manual workers 0.0989 0.0153 1.529 0.666 5.84 
(0.0036) (0.0020) (0.099) (0.038) (0.41) 
Note: Annual values, standard errors in parentheses. 
particularly dispersed in the upper part of the distribution, which in turn implies 
very small values of the density and correspondingly high productivity estimates 
(see equation (26) to see why). 
6.3. Discount Rates and Variance of U(e) 
The estimates of the discount rate p and the variance of U(e) are gathered in 
the third and fourth columns of Table V 
Two comments are brought about by the discount rate estimates. First, as we 
expected, the impatience rate tends to be higher under the assumption of linear 
preferences (although there is no striking difference for the low-skill categories). 
This corroborates the argument we briefly gave in the theory section that impa- 
tience and risk aversion play similar roles in our model: More risk averse agents 
are less willing to trade income today for higher income prospects tomorrow, 
which is exactly what a greater discount rate also implies. 
Second, under either specification, all categories of workers show a strong 
impatience rate, which is increasingly strong as the amount of skill required by 
the occupation decreases. This could mean that less skilled workers are more 
risk averse or less willing to substitute income over time (since after all, assigning 
equal values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion to all types of workers 
while allowing discount rates to vary across types is arbitrary). 
We now turn to the estimates of VU(e). The results seem to be robust 
to changes in the specification of the utility function. Both estimations indeed 
indicate that the less skilled categories show very little, if any, contribution of 
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TABLE V 
ESTIMATION OF THE REMAINING PARAMETERS 
Occupation Case U(b) U(Pmin) p V[U(C)] 
Executives, managers, and engineers U(w) = In w 4.62 4.74 0.128 0.051 
(12% annual) (0.0029) 
U(w) = w 97.1 112.9 0.353 0.100 
(30% annual) (0.0037) 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales U(w) = In w 3.99 4.21 0.320 0.019 
(27% annual) (0.0016) 
U(w) = w 53.6 67.2 0.471 0.046 
(38% annual) (0.0022) 
Technical supervisors and technicians U(w) = In w 4.07 4.22 0.240 0.006 
(21% annual) (0.0010) 
U(w) = w 56.8 66.5 0.361 0.015 
(30% annual) (0.0013) 
Administrative support U(w) = ln w 3.69 3.84 0.678 0.007 
(49% annual) (0.0014) 
U(w) = w 40.0 46.5 0.678 0.012 
(49% annual) (0.0014) 
Skilled manual workers U(w) = ln w 3.76 3.93 0.475 -0.006 
(38% annual) (0.0011) 
U(w) = w 43.3 50.3 0.443 -0.001 
(36% annual) (0.0013) 
Sales and service workers U(w) = ln w 3.55 3.61 0.653 0.003 
(48% annual) (0.0011) 
U(w) = w 34.0 36.5 0.580 0.004 
(44% annual) (0.0013) 
Unskilled manual workers U(w) = ln w 3.54 3.63 0.834 -0.004 
(57% annual) (0.0017) 
U(w) = w 33.9 37.1 0.796 -0.006 
(55% annual) (0.0017) 
personal ability to the total variance of workers' utilities. There is little more one 
can say on those results, since comparing the levels of VJ and V lns makes no 
sense. We shall return to this point in the next section. 
In any case, those large values of p, together with the fact that discount rates 
are usually said to be poorly identified, requires some discussion about the quality 
of our estimates. If we plot the GMM criterion (RMSE) used to estimate p and 
VU(s) for all values of p between 0.05 and 2.0, we see that the RMSE is a 
smooth U-shaped function of p with a clear minimum.30 Except for executives 
and managers in the log-utility case, values of p near to 5 or 10% per annum 
are clearly rejected (with an RMSE over a hundred times larger than its minimal 
value). Moreover, except for executives and managers, the estimated VU(s) is 
30 These figures are not reproduced here to save space but they are available in the working paper, 
which one can find on our web pages. 
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always zero around p = 0.05 or 0.1. Under this restriction, the model without any 
individual heterogeneity would thus already generate more wage variance than 
is observed. Lastly, the largest estimates of the variance of person effects VU(S) 
are always obtained for a value of p that is above the RMSE minimizer, and the 
estimated VU(s) that is reported in Table V is generally close to the maximal 
value obtained for any p. 
6.4. Within-firm Log-wage Variance 
Figure 2 displays the empirical and predicted within-firm log-wage vari- 
ances against the corresponding within-firm mean log wages (observed 
(1/#Ij) ,ij [U(wi) _ yj]2 and predicted V(ln wIp = pj) against empirical yj for 
all firm indices j). The scattered circles correspond to the data,31 the solid line to 
the logarithmic-utility assumption, and the dashed line to the linear-utility case. 
It is first plainly clear that the data are heteroskedastic and that the conditional 
log wage variance appears to be an increasing function of mean log wages. This 
is per se a very interesting result. It is also clear under either specification of the 
utility function that the model definitely picks up the correct overall correlation 
and the correct magnitude. 
That the within-firm log-wage variance shows an increasing trend against 
within-firm mean log wage for all categories of labor is not an unexpected result. 
One indeed typically expects the distribution of wages in more productive firms 
(or, equivalently, in firms with large mean wages) to be more dispersed than the 
distribution of wages in less productive firms both because they offer lower wages 
to unemployed workers, due to increased monopsony power, and because they 
can poach the employees of the less productive firms by offering them higher 
income prospects. That the magnitudes are also correct is a remarkable result if 
one remembers how few free parameters were estimated to fit within-firm vari- 
ances (p and VU(?)), all other parameters being estimated so as to provide a 
perfect fit to within-firm mean utilities. 
Nonetheless, the predicted conditional variance shows undulations that do not 
exist in the data and tends to overshoot its target for high p's (especially for the 
last four worker categories). The comparison of U(s) = s to U(s) = ln s is also 
interesting as it seems to indicate that the risk-neutrality assumption generates a 
within-firm log-wage variance that provides a (slightly) better fit for large values 
of within-firm mean log wage. 
We end this section by a formal comparison of the ability of the model to 
reproduce the within-firm data on means and variances of log earnings. Table VI 
displays the ratios of the weighted sums of squares of predicted to actual data for 
the within-firm mean log earnings and within-firm log-earnings variances under 
both specifications of the utility functions. They correspond to the R2 of the 
31 To be precise, we plotted only 500 points, each point corresponding to a different evaluation 
of the conditional log-wage variance given mean log wage y, for 500 equidistant values of mean log 
wages in the interval [Ymin ymx]. Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimators of conditional means are used 
to smooth the empirical conditional variance using the formula: VX = EX2 - (EX)2. 
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TABLE VI 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS FOR FIRM DATA 
Occupation Case Mean log wagea Log-wage variancea 
Executives, managers, and engineers U(w) = In w 0.9997 1.226 
U(w) = w 1.0178 1.133 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales U(w) = In w 1.0004 1.213 
U(w) = w 1.0076 1.159 
Technical supervisors and technicians U(w) = In w 1.0001 1.364 
U(w) = w 1.0024 1.185 
Administrative support U(w) = In w 0.9994 1.306 
U(w) = w 1.0018 1.238 
Skilled manual workers U(w) = In w 1.0005 1.613 
U(w) = w 0.9986 1.913 
Sales and service workers U(w) = In w 0.9993 2.214 
U(w) = w 1.0000 1.597 
Unskilled manual workers U(w) = In w 0.9992 3.824 
U(w) = w 0.9985 2.703 
aR2 of the weighted regression of actual on predicted (no constant, regression coefficient = 1). 
weighted regression of actual on predicted variables with no intercept when the 
coefficient of the predicted variable is constrained to one. It is clear that the 
model reproduces very accurately the within-firm mean log wages even for the 
linear-utility case, although the productivity estimates were chosen so as to pro- 
vide the best fit to within-firm mean wages instead of mean log wages, indicating 
that Identifying Assumption 2 is well accepted by the data for both specifications 
of the utility function. The prediction of mean log wages is thus not going to be 
of much help as a criterion to choose between different risk aversion coefficients. 
The results on variances are more informative. First the R2 is always greater 
than 1, indicating the model's tendency to overpredict the within-firm variance of 
log earnings in the upper part of the distribution of within-firm mean log wages. 
This is particularly true for the less skilled categories. Second, confirming the 
previous visual impression, the linear utility seems to produce less overshooting 
than the logarithmic utility in most cases. 
6.5. Individual Log-wage Variance Decomposition 
We now analyze the results of the log-wage variance decomposition described 
in Section 3.5. Simulating a cross-section of values of 0(1, q, p), as indicated in 
Section B.3.1 of the Appendix, allows us to compute the last two terms in the 
right-hand side of the decomposition formula (12). We obtain a "global" estimate 
of V ln ? by taking the difference to V ln w.32 
32 Note that, in the log-utility case, another estimator of V In e is available from the conditional 
variance regression (see the second paragraph in Appendix B.2). The two estimators give close results 
(see Tables V and VII). 
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The log-wage variance decomposition is reported in Table VII. First, we can 
note that both specifications of the preferences result in similar shares of each 
effect in the explanation of total log-wage variance. At the very least, the quali- 
tative picture is the same under either assumption. The model thus successfully 
passes this robustness test. Second, and more importantly, we obtain a remark- 
able result: individual ability differences explain about 40% of the log-wage 
variance for executives, managers and engineers, 20% for workers with lower 
executive functions, 10% for technicians and technical supervisors and the admin- 
istrative support staff, and virtually nothing for the other categories. It therefore 
seems that the more sophisticated the occupation is, the more difficult it is to 
predict the efficiency of a worker given his observable attributes. To put it dif- 
ferently, the more skill-intensive an occupation is, the more heterogeneous is the 
category of workers who can apply to it. At the bottom of the skill hierarchy, 
manual workers and employees are rather homogeneous as far as productive 
efficiency is concerned. In all cases, a significantly more important share of the 
variance (45 to 60%) is due to differences in individual histories, which are cap- 
tured by the friction effect term in our decomposition formula (12). 
As a matter of comparing our results to those of previous contributions, again 
we should cite AKM and Abowd and Kramarz (2000), who use the same data as 
we do, but on a different time span, and find over the whole sample, controlling 
for observed skill characteristics, that the person effect accounts for more or 
less 50% of total log-wage variance. Even though we ran separate estimations 
for each skill category, our results make it clear that the average weight of the 
person effect over the whole sample is by far less than a half. 
The credibility of these results rests on Identifying Assumption 3 that mean 
earnings utilities correctly sort the firms by unobserved productivities. Remem- 
ber that because many of these firms have small sizes, mean earnings utilities 
are thus subject to statistical errors, for example due to fluctuations around the 
equilibrium value that the model predicts.33 It may thus be that many firms have 
erroneously been assigned equal productivity values. Now, clearly, any realloca- 
tion of firms into different productivity clusters will end up reducing the ability 
of the productivity indicator to explain the dispersion of individual earnings util- 
ities and, hence, increasing the share of individual heterogeneity. Our current 
estimates are therefore to be thought of as lower bounds for the contribution of 
person effects to the log-wage variance. 
In order to analyze the sensitivity of our results with respect to sampling errors, 
we adopt a Bayesian perspective and consider the asymptotic approximation: 
(14) Yj < NE[U(w)lp=p] V[U(w)p = p1j] 
which holds for large firm sizes, as a prior for mean utilities E[U(w)lp = pj]. 
In other words, we start from the belief that the true mean earnings utility 
33 Here we discuss estimation errors in the context of a well specified model. Any source of model 
misspecification, like human capital accumulation generating changes in the workers' abilities, is of 
course another potential source of estimation error, which requires a proper model to be analyzed. 
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TABLE 
VII 
LOG 
WAGE 
VARIANCE 
DECOMPOSITION 
Mean 
Total 
log-wage 
Firm 
effect: 
Search 
friction 
effect: 
Person 
effect: 
log 
wage: 
variance/coeff. 
var. 
Case 
VE(ln 
wlp) 
EV(ln 
wlp) 
- 
V 
In 
E 
VInE 
Occupation 
Nobs. 
E(ln 
w) 
V(ln 
w) 
CV 
U(w) 
= 
Value 
% 
of 
V(ln 
w) 
Value 
% 
of 
V(ln 
w) 
Value 
% 
of 
V(ln 
w) 
Executives, 
manager, 
555,230 
4.81 
0.180 
0.088 
In 
w 
0.035 
19.3 
0.082 
45.5 
0.063 
35.2 
and 
engineers 
w 
0.035 
19.4 
0.070 
38.7 
0.076 
41.9 
Supervisors, 
administrative 
447,974 
4.28 
0.125 
0.083 
Inw 
0.034 
27.5 
0.065 
52.1 
0.025 
20.3 
and 
sales 
w 
0.034 
27.9 
0.069 
55.1 
0.022 
17.8 
Technical 
supervisors 
209,078 
4.31 
0.077 
0.064 
In 
w 
0.025 
32.4 
0.044 
57.6 
0.008 
10.0 
and 
technicians 
w 
0.025 
32.8 
0.047 
60.6 
0.0 5 
6.6 
Administrative 
support 
440,045 
4.00 
0.082 
0.072 
In 
w 
0.029 
35.7 
0.043 
52.2 
0.01  
12.1 
w 
0.028 
34.6 
0.045 
55.7 
0.0 8 
9.7 
Skilled 
manual 
workers 
372,430 
4.05 
0.069 
0.065 
Inw 
0.029 
42.9 
0.039 
57.1 
0 
0 
w 
0.028 
41.5 
0.040 
58.  
0 
0 
Sales 
and 
service 
workers 
174,704 
3.74 
0.050 
0.060 
lnw 
0.02  
40.8 
0.029 
58.7 
0.0002 
0.4 
w 
0.019 
37.1 
0.029 
57.9 
0.0 25 
5.0 
Unskilled 
manual 
workers 
167,580 
3.77 
0.057 
0.063 
lnw 
0.027 
48.3 
0.029 
51.7 
0 
0 
w 
0.023 
40.8 
0.033 
59.2 
0 
0 
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of employees of firm j is yj plus an error uj that has a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance the empirical within-firm variance divided by firm 
size: (1/(#Ij)2) Eij[U(wi)yj]2. In order to evaluate the consequences in 
terms of the decomposition of log-wage variances, we simulate alternative values 
YJ = yJ + u8 by adding a simulated error term Us drawn from the relevant normal 
distribution to the observed y1 for all establishments of the sample, and reesti- 
mate the model with the new mean utility values as for the actual data. Note that 
firms that were originally assigned close productivities because they had close 
mean utility values in the original sample can now end up at very distant points 
of the distribution of p's, particularly if their small sizes imply a relatively large 
error variance. We repeat the experiment 500 times for each occupation and 
each specification of the preferences. Table VIII below reproduces certain quan- 
tiles of the posterior distributions of the shares of each effect (person, firm, and 
friction) in the explanation of total log-wage variance, as well as those of the 
estimated annual discount factor (1 - e-P). 
What Table VIII shows is that none of those estimates are dramatically affected 
by sampling errors. All reported distributions are very concentrated (albeit with 
quite long tails). Looking at the medians and comparing them to the point esti- 
mates of Table VII, we see that, as expected, "shuffling" the establishments as we 
do in this sensitivity check diminishes the explanatory power of the firm effect 
and reinforces that of the person effect. But the general order of magnitude of 
the discrepancy is only a few percentage points. Only in the case of sales and 
service workers with linear preferences does the estimated share of the person 
effect seem to really be on the low side in terms of the distribution sketched in 
Table VIII (the estimated value using the original sample is 5% , while the 5th 
and 10th percentiles of the posterior distribution of the estimator taking account 
of sampling errors are 0 and 9% respectively). This may be due in part to the rel- 
atively high density of small establishments in this occupational category. Finally, 
concerning the annual discount factor, a comparison with the values obtained in 
Table V reveals no general pattern in the discrepancies, and suggests that the 
estimate of p is also reasonably insensitive to sampling errors. 
6.6. Cross-sectional Earnings Distributions 
All the parameters of the model being now estimated, and the validity of Iden- 
tifying Assumptions 2 and 3 assessed, we can simulate the model and compare 
the actual distributions of earnings to the predicted ones. Figure 3 provides, for 
each of the seven professions we consider, the graphs of the quantile functions 
for the distribution of individual log wages and the distribution of ln 4(1, q, p) 
when (p, q) is distributed as explained in Section 3.4.34 The latter distribution is 
the distribution predicted by the model when there is no dispersion of abilities. 
34 The figure shows the results for the log-linear utility case as the linear utility case shows similar 
patterns. Appendix B.3.1 explains the simulation technique that we use to compute these quantile 
functions. 
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TABLE 
VIII 
POSTERIOR 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF 
SOME 
PARAMETERS 
Quantiles 
Case 
U(w)=lnw 
Case 
U(w)=Inw 
Occupation 
Parameter 
(%) 
5% 
10% 
50% 
90% 
95% 
5% 
10% 
50% 
90% 
95% 
Executives, 
Annual 
discount 
8.8 
9.5 
11.5 
13.5 
14.6 
21.1 
29.7 
35.1 
40.9 
43.7 
managers, 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
17.5 
17.6 
17.8 
18.0 
18.  
17.7 
17.8 
18.0 
18.3 
18.8 
and 
engineers 
Share 
of 
frictions 
39.  
40.0 
42.6 
46.0 
46.9 
28.  
29.0 
31.4 
34.6 
43.9 
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
35.4 
36.1 
39.6 
42.2 
43.2 
37.4 
47.4 
50.7 
53.0 
53.8 
Supervisors, 
Annual 
discount 
11.3 
17.4 
20.3 
24.3 
69.7 
14.1 
31.1 
38.7 
43.6 
56.9 
administrative, 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
25.2 
25.2 
25.5 
25.9 
26.4 
24.3 
24.6 
24.9 
25.3 
26.2 
and 
sales 
Share 
of 
frictions 
46.1 
50.  
53.0 
55.5 
64.1 
34.0 
44.7 
48.8 
52.0 
57.8 
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
4.8 
18.3 
21.4 
24.2 
27.  
2.6 
22.5 
26.2 
29.  
37.9 
Technical 
Annual 
discount 
7.7 
13.2 
16.1 
19.4 
20.6 
11.6 
24.2 
29.4 
33.2 
50.8 
supervisors 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
30.  
30.8 
31.3 
31.8 
32.1 
30.8 
31.1 
31.6 
32.7 
35.4 
and 
technicians 
Share 
of 
frictions 
51.  
55.7 
59.1 
62.8 
67.2 
39.9 
54.4 
58.  
62.5 
65.1 
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
0 
3.6 
9.6 
12.7 
14.1 
0 
1.2 
10.1 
13.  
15.  
Administrative 
Annual 
discount 
16.8 
28.8 
35.1 
41.3 
43.7 
14.1 
29.5 
49.2 
59.8 
99.2 
support 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
33.7 
33.8 
34.1 
34.5 
34.6 
28.0 
32.3 
32.8 
33.7 
34.6 
Share 
of 
frictions 
52.0 
52.8 
55.7 
59.6 
65.  
37.0 
47.4 
52.6 
63.8 
65.7 
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
0 
6.0 
10.2 
13.0 
13.8 
0 
0 
14.4 
19.  
34.3 
Skilled 
Annual 
discount 
24.7 
25.3 
27.1 
29.1 
29.1 
19.2 
26.5 
30.6 
33.9 
39.5 
manual 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
40.3 
40.4 
40.7 
41.1 
41.  
38.7 
38.8 
39.1 
39.8 
41.7 
workers 
Share 
of 
frictions 
58.8 
58.9 
59.3 
59.6 
59.7 
56.6 
59.9 
60.9 
61.2 
61.3 
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Sales 
and 
Annual 
discount 
27.3 
29.9 
33.0 
34.6 
36.4 
16.5 
41.6 
48.0 
50.9 
50.9 
service 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
38.  
38.4 
38.9 
39.6 
39.9 
33.0 
34.1 
35.0 
35.7 
35.9 
workers 
Share 
of 
frictions 
60.0 
60.  
61.1 
61.6 
61.8 
50.5 
51.0 
52.6 
55.8 
67.0 
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.3 
0 
9.0 
12.3 
14.0 
14.7 
Unskilled 
Annual 
discount 
21.9 
37.5 
39.4 
41.5 
42.6 
17.4 
46.2 
48.9 
51.7 
51.7 
manual 
Share 
of 
firm 
effect 
46.1 
46.  
47.0 
47.6 
47.7 
37.6 
38.7 
39.5 
40.2 
40.3 
workers 
Share 
of 
frictions 
52.3 
52.  
53.0 
53.7 
53.9 
59.4 
59.6 
60.4 
61.2 
62.  
Share 
of 
person 
effect 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.8 
1.3 
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First, we observe a discontinuity in the quantile function for In 0(1, q, p) that is 
entirely due to the gap between b and Pmin. It is plainly clear that U(Pmin) - U(b) 
is far too large for the distribution of wages offered to former unemployed to be 
jointed with the distribution of wages obtained from on-the-job search. The data 
seem to require heterogeneity in b as well as heterogeneity in E to mix the lower 
part of the distribution of predicted wages and provide a better fit. We leave this 
extension to further work.35 
Second, one sees why we estimate no ability dispersion for low skilled workers. 
The model with no worker heterogeneity works quite well to explain the disper- 
sion of log earnings in this case. For skilled manual workers, the fit is good in 
the upper part of the distribution but bad in the lower part because of the wide 
wedge between U(Pmin) and U(b). 
The distribution of log wages is equal to the convolution of the distribution of 
ln 0(1, q, p) with the distribution of ln E, i.e. H. Figure 4 plots the deconvolution 
results using the method described in Appendix B.3 for the first four categories.36 
The estimates for the linear and logarithmic cases are superimposed on the same 
graphics to emphasize the differences. It turns out that there are strikingly few dif- 
ferences. The choice of the utility function therefore has a very limited impact on 
the estimated distribution of unobserved worker abilities. Moreover, as it should 
be given the preceding estimates of V ln 8, the distribution for the first group of 
workers is flatter than that for the second group, which is itself flatter than the last 
two. The right tail of the distribution of ln E is also thicker for the first group. 
For the first four categories of more skilled workers, the actual distribution of 
wages dominates the predicted one (with no worker heterogeneity) in the upper 
part of the distribution. This demonstrates the necessity of allowing for hetero- 
geneous abilities, which we now do. As is also explained in Appendix B.3, the 
deconvolution method can also deliver the cdf's of ln E, from which we can get 
random draws of worker abilities and thus simulate a complete cross-section of 
wages (in fact, all we have to do at this point is add a cross section of ln E's 
randomly selected from H to the cross section of ln 0(1, q, p)'s already simu- 
lated). The predicted cross-worker log-wage densities are plotted together with 
the observed ones on Figure 5 (densities are estimated using a normal kernel). 
We see that the fit is improved, except at the left end of the wage distribution. 
This again points to the need of some heterogeneity in the workers' "at-home" 
productivity parameters, b. 
Note that standard goodness of fit tests like the chi-squared or Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov tests always reject the null that the model is correctly specified. This was 
to be expected given the large sample sizes. Table IX displays the chi-squared 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics divided by sample sizes for each estimated 
log-earnings distribution.37 The corresponding p-values are not reported as they 
35 Heterogeneity in b is present in the theoretical model that we constructed in a previous paper 
(Postel-Vinay and Robin (1999)). 
36 Our attempts at retrieving a nondegenerate distribution of ln ? for the remaining three categories 
failed, as expected given that their estimated variance of ln ? was 0. 
37 How we exactly compute the chi-square and K-S statistics is explained in a note to Table IX. 
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FIGURE 4.-Density of log individual abilities. 
are always nil. Nevertheless, the significant reduction in the test statistics when 
worker heterogeneity is incorporated shows that allowing for individual hetero- 
geneity (when possible) improves the fit by a lot. Define the "empirical size" of 
these tests as the maximal sample size above which the null hypothesis (identical 
simulated and actual distributions) is rejected at the 5%o level. Without unob- 
served worker heterogeneity the empirical size of both tests is of the order of 
one to five hundred. It is more than ten times larger with worker heterogene- 
ity. This indicates a very good fit. Interestingly, the quality of the fit does not 
depend on the specification of the utility function. Finally, the fact that there 
is not enough wage variance to allow for worker heterogeneity among manual 
workers and unskilled employees explains the relatively poor performance of the 
model for the low skill categories. 
6.7. Recruiting Effort, Productivity and Firm Size 
As we argued when exposing the basic assumptions of our theoretical model, 
our specialization of an unconstrained "sampling density" ff () and its relation- 
ship to that of firm types in the population of firms Py( ) potentially conveys some 
information about the process through which firms and workers are matched. 
More precisely, we saw that the sampling weights f (p) I y(p) of firms by workers 
in the search process could be interpreted as the average flow of "help-wanted 
ads" or "job vacancies" posted by type p firms per unit time. Broadly speaking, 
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FIGURE 5.-Simulated (--- ) and actual (-) log-earnings distributions. 
those sampling weights provide a measure of the average effort put into hiring 
by type p firms. 
The most obvious result, which is robust across all categories of labor is that the 
sampling weights decrease with productivity: more productive firms devote less 
effort to hiring, which naturally makes them less efficient in contacting potential 
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TABLE IX 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOG EARNINGS 
Chi-squared Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Occupation Case without E with E without E with E 
Executives, managers, and engineers U(w) = In w 0.580 0.025 0.211 0.015 
U(w) = w 0.485 0.029 0.155 0.030 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales U(w) = In w 0.865 0.032 0.231 0.013 
U(w) = w 0.670 0.031 0.180 0.013 
Technical supervisors and technicians U(w) = In w 0.395 0.035 0.125 0.021 
U(w) = w 0.323 0.031 0.123 0.024 
Administrative support U(w) = nw 0.509 0.048 0.117 0.036 
U(w) = w 0.565 0.049 0.111 0.035 
Skilled manual workers U(w) = In w 0.283 - 0.103 
U(w) = w 0.276 0.095 
Sales and service workers U(w) = ln w 0.324 - 0.104 
U(w) = w 0.332 - 0.085 
Unskilled manual workers U(w) = nw 0.384 - 0.113 
U(w) = w 0.369 0.088 
Note: We compute the chi-square statistic as follows. First we split the earnings cross-section into m adjacent quantiles. Let Pi be the 
proportion of simulated wages falling in the ith quantile. The chi-square statistic reported in Table IX is x2 = (1/m) Em (fi(1/m))2 
for m = 50. Under the null that the distribution of simulated values is the same as the empirical distribution of actual values, 
nX2 _+ 2(m - 1), where n is the sample size. A value of x2 = 0.5 will not reject the null at the 5% level if the sample size is no 
greater than about 140; for a value x2 = 0.05 less than 1.400 observations is required (for m > 30 we apply the following inequality: 
n < (1.96+,?/2(m-1)- /2j2). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic K compares the empirical cdf of simulated values F to the empirical cdf of actual values 
Fo: K = max. IF(w) - Fo(w)1. Under the null that these two distributions are equal, l/hk converges in distribution to a fixed 
distribution K (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution). For K = 0.1 the maximal sample size such that the null is not rejected at the 
5% level is 185; for k = 0.02 it is 4.624 (n < (1.36/k)2). 
new employees. On the other hand, since they are also more attractive to workers, 
they are more efficient in retaining their employees and attracting the workers 
that they do contact. Those two counteracting forces sum up to a nonmonotonic 
effect on mean firm size, which is generally a hump-shaped function of firm type: 
low-p firms do not fully compensate their lack of competitiveness in the Bertrand 
game by their higher recruiting effort, while high-p firms are not among the 
largest in spite of their attractiveness because they contact too few workers. 
Given our estimated relationship between firm hiring efforts and sizes, we may 
find it interesting to assess which one of the two extreme assumptions (balanced 
and random matching) is closest to our more general model's predictions. It is 
clear from Figure 6 that hiring efforts and firm sizes are not in a monotonic 
relationship. We thus clearly reject both assumptions of random and balanced 
matching and rather plead in favor of differentiated search efforts put forth by 
the various firm types-and even within each firm type, given the conditional 
heterogeneity of firm sizes. A deeper look into the "job vacancy posting" behavior 
of firms is on our research agenda. 
The second comment suggested by Figure 6 concerns the so-called "firm-size 
wage effect," i.e. the often cited stylized fact that larger firms pay higher wages on 
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average. Given that mpl's and mean log wages are in an increasing relationship 
with each other in our model, one should thus expect the relationship of p to 
firm sizes to be upward sloping. What Figure 6 seems to suggest is that this is 
only true at the lower levels of productivity and/or average wages. This result only 
apparently contradicts the "firm-size wage effect." Going back to the raw data 
and looking at the empirical relationship between firm sizes and average wages, 
it is easy to check that, even though the coefficient of a linear regression of (log) 
firm sizes against mean log wages is admittedly positive (albeit relatively small), 
a regression of (log) firm sizes against a second-order polynomial of mean log 
wages precisely predicts this hump shape. 
7. DYNAMIC SIMULATIONS 
The most severe specification test of which we could conceive is to look at how 
good (or bad) the model is at predicting wage mobility along the line of Tables II 
and III on which we have already commented. Tables X and XI display the results 
of a dynamic simulation of 10,000 trajectories for each professional category. The 
main discrepancy between real and simulated data is that the model does not do 
well (to say the least) in predicting downward wage mobility. We produce rather 
good upward wage mobility predictions for workers changing employers (the last 
two columns of Tables II and X are quite close). Yet, the simulations are clearly 
not as good for those workers holding the same job over the one year simulation 
period since we predict too few downward and upward wage changes. This is 
true in particular for the low-skilled categories. 
TABLE X 
DYNAMIC SIMULATION VARIATION IN REAL WAGE AFTER 
FIRST RECORDED JOB-TO-JOB MOBILITY 
Median % obs. such that A log wage < 
Occupation Case Alog wage (%) -0.10 -0.05 0 0.05 0.10 
Executives, managers, and engineers U(w) = in w 3.1 13.0 22.9 38.8 55.1 65.4 
U(w) = w 3.7 7.9 17.3 34.9 54.0 65.1 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales U(w) = In w 3.3 2.7 12.4 35.0 55.8 66.7 
U(w) = w 2.6 3.3 11.2 34.2 57.9 69.7 
Technical supervisors and technicians U(w) = In w 2.8 4.2 10.0 32.2 57.8 71.8 
U(w) = w 3.9 2.9 9.0 34.2 54.8 69.3 
Administrative support U(w) = nw 5.1 1.1 6.1 24.3 49.7 64.4 
U(w) = w 5.3 1.0 5.2 24.0 49.2 63.8 
Skilled manual workers U(w) = ln w 4.5 1.7 7.5 28.2 51.7 66.0 
U(w) = w 4.4 4.3 12.4 30.6 51.7 64.7 
Sales and service workers U(w) = ln w 3.0 0.2 5.5 31.0 59.1 75.3 
U(w) = w 3.4 2.0 8.2 30.7 57.2 75.1 
Unskilled manual workers U(w) = ln w 3.6 0.2 4.4 29.4 55.5 70.0 
U(w) = w 2.7 1.0 7.3 32.4 58.6 70.0 
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TABLE XI 
DYNAMIC SIMULATION YEARLY VARIATION IN REAL WAGE WHEN HOLDING 
THE SAME JOB OVER THE YEAR 
Median % obs. such that A log wage < 
Occupation Case Alog wage (%) -0.10 -0.05 0 0.05 0.10 
Executives, managers, and engineers U(w) = In w 0 0 0 85.8 93.9 96.6 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 84.2 93.7 96.8 
Supervisors, administrative, and sales U(w) = In w 0 0 0 84.7 94.8 97.3 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 84.5 95.1 97.3 
Technical supervisors and technicians U(w) = In w 0 0 0 87.2 95.8 97.9 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 85.9 96.1 98.1 
Administrative support U(w) = In w 0 0 0 84.9 94.7 97.3 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 82.9 94.9 97.2 
Skilled manual workers U(w) = In w 0 0 0 85.6 94.5 97.2 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 83.7 94.2 96.8 
Sales and service workers U(w) = ln w 0 0 0 84.0 94.9 97.5 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 82.8 94.8 97.4 
Unskilled manual workers U(w) = ln w 0 0 0 84.5 94.2 96.8 
U(w) = w 0 0 0 82.6 94.4 97.3 
A better capacity of predicting wage dynamics would have been suspect as it 
is unbelievable that all job mobilities with wage cuts could be explained by the 
option-value motive. A large part of wage mobility is likely to reflect idiosyncratic 
labor productivity shocks, as about 15 to 20% of earnings are bonuses that are 
indexed to firm performances. They can naturally (partly) be explained by moral 
hazard considerations but they are also likely to reflect exogenous fluctuations 
in market conditions or firm productivity. Another item to add to the research 
agenda is thus an extension of the model to allow for idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks, maybe along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main contribution of this paper is an investigation of the properties of 
the distribution of wages within an equilibrium job search model with on-the-job 
search, using matched employer and employee data. The theoretical model 
features heterogeneous productivity attributes for both firms and workers, and 
an original wage setting mechanism that departs from the conventional alterna- 
tive assumptions of wage posting or wage bargaining. The model provides new 
results about the decomposition of log-wage variance into three components: a 
firm effect, a person effect, and an effect of labor market frictions. Its success at 
fitting the data and passing specification tests is overall satisfactory. 
Now it is obvious that many important components of wage dispersion have 
been assumed away: Idiosyncratic productivity shocks, wage bargaining, individ- 
ual changes in ability and compensating differentials, let alone the fact that wage 
posting might be a better assumption for the wage setting mechanism at work 
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on low-skilled labor markets, are potential sources of wage mobility. Their omis- 
sion might be responsible for an overestimation of the role of search frictions in 
determining wage dispersion. Yet, the fact that we have been able to construct 
and rather easily estimate the complicated model of this paper is, we believe, by 
itself an important methodological achievement as it opens the way to the esti- 
mation of even more comprehensive equilibrium models of the labor market. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF SOME THEORETIcAL RESULTS 
A.1. Equilibrium Wage Determination 
In this Appendix we derive the precise form of equilibrium wages 4(s, p, p'). The first step is 
to compute the value functions VO(.) and V(.). Since offers accrue to unemployed workers at rate 
AO, Vo(8) solves the following Bellman equation: 
(p + / + AO)Vo(S) = U(sb) + AoEF{V(L, o(? X), X)}, 
where EF is the expectation operator with respect to a variable X that has distribution F. Using 
definition (1) to replace V(s, 4o(s, p), p) by Vo (s) in the latter equation then shows that 
(15) V (S) U(sb) 
We thus find that an unemployed worker's expected lifetime utility depends on his personal ability s 
only through the amount of output he produces when engaged in home production, sb. This naturally 
results from the fact that his first employer is able to appropriate the entire surplus generated by the 
match until the worker gets his first outside offer. The only income for which the employer originally 
has to compensate the worker is sb. 
Now turning to employed workers, consider a type-s worker employed at a type-p firm and earning 
a wage w < sp. This worker is hit by outside offers from competing firms at rate A1. If the offer 
stems from a firm with mpl p' such that 4(s, p', p) < w, then the challenging firm is obviously less 
attractive to the worker than his current employer since it cannot even offer him his current wage. 
The worker thus rejects the offer and continues his current employment relationship at an unchanged 
wage rate. Now if the offer stems from a type-p' < p firm such that w < 4(S, p', p) < ?p, then the 
offer is iiiatched by p, in which case the challenging firm p' will not be able to attract the worker but 
the incumbent employer will have to grant the worker a raise-up to 4(s, p', p)-to retain him from 
accepting the other firm's offer. This leaves the worker with a lifetime utility of V(s, sp', p'). Finally, 
if the offer originates from a firm more productive than p, then the worker eventually accepts the 
outside offer and goes working at the type-p' firm for a wage 0(s, p, p') and a utility V(?, Sp, p). 
For a given worker type-s and a given mpl p, define the threshold mpl q(s, w, p) by 
4(s, q(s, w, p), p) = W, 
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so that k(s, p', p) < w if p' < q(&, w, p). Contacts with firms less productive than q(8, w, p) end up 
not causing any wage increase because the current employer (with a technology yielding productivity 
p) can outbid such a challenging firm by offering a wage lower than w. Since in addition layoffs and 
deaths still occur at respective rates 8 and ,u, we may now write the Bellman equation solved by the 
value function V(s, w, p): 
(16) [p + 8 + ,u + A1 F(q(s, w, p))] V(8, w, p) 
= U(w) + A [F(p) - F(q(s, w, p))]EF{V(8, ?X, X)Iq(s, w, p) < X < p} 
+ A 1F(p)V(s, sp, p) + 8Vo(s). 
Imposing w = sp in the latter relationship, we easily get 
(17) V(' Sp, p) = (Sp) +5Vo(?) 
Note that this expression is independent of the particular form of the unemployment value Vo(s). 
Plugging this back into (16), replacing the expectation term by its expression, and integrating by 
parts, we finally get a definition of V(.): 
(18) (p?8 +,+)V(8, w, p) = U(w) +8Vo (?) + A 
P 
F(x)U'(?x) dx. 
We can now derive expressions of the reservation wages 40( ) and k( ), as well as the threshold 
mpl q(.). We begin with the latter for a given productivity p and a given worker type-?. Using (17) 
and (18) together with the fact that, by definition, 
V(s, w, p) = V(?, ?q(s, w, p), q(s, w, p)), 
we get an implicit definition of q(&, w, p): 
(19) U(Lq(s, w, p))- A p F(x)?U'(?x) dx = U(w). 
p + 5+ / q(e,w,p) 
Note that, as intuition suggests, (19) shows that q(&, ?p, p) = p. Now consider a pair of firm types p < 
p'. Substituting 4(8, p, p') for w in (19), using the fact that q(&, 4(8, p, p'), p') = p, and rearranging 
terms, we get 
(3) U(Al(, p, p ))-=U(p) _ 8 ] F(x)?U (?x) dx. 
We now turn to the unemployed workers' reservation wages 00( ), which are defined by the 
equality (1). Replacing w by o(? p) in (16) and noticing that q(8, o(? p), p) = b,38 we get, for 
any given s, 
(20) k0(s, p) = k(s, b, p) = U- (U(sb) - p + F(x)U (?x) dx). 
38 This is shown by the definition of q(-) and 40( ): 
V (?) = V(s, o(? p), p) = V(8, ?q(.), q()), 
which implies from (15) and (17) that q(&, o(? p), p) = b. 
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A.2. Equilibrium Wage Distributions 
The G(wIs, p)e(s, p)(l - u)M workers of type s, employed at firms of type p, and paid less 
than w E [40(8, p), Sp] leave this category either because they are laid off (rate 8), or because they 
retire (rate /,), or finally because they receive an offer from a firm with mpl p > q(s, w, p) that 
grants them a wage increase or induces them to leave their current firm (rate AIF[q(8, w, p)]). On 
the inflow side, workers entering the category (ability s, wage < w, mpl p) come from two distinct 
sources. Either they are hired away from a firm less productive than q(s, w, p), or they come from 
unemployment. The steady-state equality between flows into and out of the stocks G(wI8, p)e(8, p) 
thus takes the form 
(21) {8 +/,u + A1F[q(s, w, p)]}G(w18, p)e(s, p)(l - u)M 
((,,wwp) 
= AouM h(s) + Al (1 - u)M X ?(, x) dx f (P) 
Pmin 
q(e,w,p) 
= (5 + /)h(h) + AlJ X (s,x)dx (1-u)Mf(p), 
Pmin 
since A0u =( + ,u)(1-u). Applying this indentity for w = ?p (which has the property that 
G(spIs, p) = 1 and q(s, sp, p) = p), we get 
{8+,u+AlF(p)}e(s, p) = { (8+1p)h(s)+ A1 j (,X) dx) (p), 
which solves as 
1+Kl 
P) 
= [+ (p ] h(s)f(p)- 
This shows that ?(8, p) has the form h(s)e(p) (absence of sorting), and gives the expression of ?(p); 
hence the equations (8) and (9). Equation (8) can be integrated between Pmin and p to obtain (7). 
Substituting (7), (8), and (9) into (21) finally yields equation (10). 
A.3. Derivation of E[T(w) Ip] for any Integrable Function T(w) 
The lowest paid type-s worker in a type-p firm is one that has just been hired, therefore earning 
k0(s p), while the highest-paid type-s worker in that firm earns his marginal productivity ?p. Having 
thus defined the support of the within-firm earnings distribution of type ? workers for any type-p 
firm, we can readily show that for any integrable function T(w), 
Emax / Sp 
E[T(w) IP =- IJ T(w)G(dw I, p) + T(40(s, p))G(q0(s, p),Isp, h(s)ds 
6min \ ko(s,P) 
=[1+K1F(P)] 2 (1+K )2 T T(40(8 p))h(s)ds 
=fX T(8p-h(8id- [1K+K1 F(p)] 
Emmn 
axi (p T(s(8,QsP- 1 
x Jb [ftm U' ( q Q, P U '(q) h ()d] +(1 _-)Kl(q) dq. 
The first equality follows from the definition of G(w1I, p) as 
G(wl1, p) [1+Kl F(p)]2 d [1+ KlF(q(s, W, p))]2' 
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yielding 
G'(w|?, p) = [1 + K2(F(p)]2 2) q) F q(- , w, 
p dw. 
K1F()]2(8)[1 +KlF(q)]3 9w 
The second equality is obtained with an integration by part, deriving the partial derivative of 
4(s, q, p) with respect to q from (3) as 
U'(4(8, q, p)) ) = ?U'(sq)[l + K(1 - o')F(q)]. 9q 
Equation (13) follows when T(w) = U(w). 
APPENDIX B: DETAILS OF THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
Each one of the three estimation steps is detailed in the next three sections. 
B.1. Estimation of the Transition Parameters 8, ,, AO, and A1 from Transition Data 
B.1.1. Data 
The recording period starts at time 0 (namely January 1st, 1996) and ends at time T (namely 
December 31st, 1998). All the N sampled individuals are employed at the beginning of the observa- 
tion period. Recall that dli is defined as the length of individual i's first employment spell, i.e. the 
amount of time this individual stays at his/her first employer. If the spell ends before the end of the 
recording period T, and if it is not immediately followed by another employment spell in a differ- 
ent establishment (job-to-job transition), d2i denotes the length of the period spent out of the survey 
(in unemployment, inactivity, self-employment, or the public sector) before a possible reentry. An 
individual initially present in the panel may therefore be in one of the following four situations: 
(i) The first employment spell is censored: dli = T. 
(ii) The first employment spell is not censored (dli < T), and ends with a job-to-job transition: 
d2i = 0. 
(iii) The first employment spell is not censored (dli < T), does not end with a job-to-job transition, 
and the subsequent attrition period is censored: d2i = T - dli. 
(iv) The first employment spell is not censored (dli < T), does not end with a job-to-job transition, 
and the subsequent attrition period is not censored: 0 < d2i < T - dli. 
Moreover, as was already mentioned, wages do not vary continuously over time and the adminis- 
trative data give no clue as to exactly when promotions take place. Under the model's assumption, 
however, yearly wages cannot decline unless the worker changes employers. Then, if two subsequent 
yearly wage declarations by the same employer for the same worker significantly differ from one 
year to the next, then it must be that at least one contact was made by the worker of an alternative 
employer which was productive enough for his/her current employer to grant the employee a wage 
rise. Now, let ni be the number of recorded wage rises within the period of time dli. If dli < 1, then 
ni = 0 with probability one; if 1 < dli < 2, then ni is either 0 or 1; if dli > 2 then ni can be either 0, 1 
or 2; etc... It is difficult to derive the distribution of ni (whatever conditional on) when dli > 2. For- 
tunately, it is rather easy to calculate the probability of ni = 0 given dii = d and given the employer's 
type in the first spell, pi. It is the expected value of the probability of ni = 0 given dli and pi and 
given the unobserved worker type s and initial wage w (i.e. at the onset of the recording period), 
that is the expected value of exp {-Al[F(q(E, w, p)) - F(p)]d} with respect to ? and w. Let vi be 1 
if ni = 0 and 0 otherwise. 
We estimate 8, ,u, AO, and Al by maximizing the likelihood of the N observations (dli, vi, d2; i = 
1, . . ., N) conditional on the observed indicator of the first employer's type (i.e. yj = 
(l/#Ij) >i,jj U(wi) for j = f ). The exact computation of the likelihood of each independent obser- 
vation (d1i, vi, d2i) conditional on the employer's productivity indicator yf is carried out in the next 
subsection. 
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B.1.2. Likelihood 
Let ?i designate the contribution of individual i to the likelihood of the N observations. We can 
factorize ii into the product of two components: Eli, which is the likelihood of (dli, d2i) given yi, and 
?2i, which is the probability of l{ni = 0} given yi and dli. In the sequel, we simply denote as pi the 
unique value of p that is such that yf, = y(pi) = E[U(w)Ip = pi]. 
We begin with ?2i. As is explained in the main text, the probability of ni = 0 given dli = d and the 
employer's type in the first spell pi is the expected value of exp {-Al [F(q(s, w, p)) - F(p)] d} with 
respect to s and w: 
(22) Pr{ni = ? O dli = d, pi = p} 
/fmax 
EP 
e-Al [F(q(s,w,p))-F(p)]d G(dwl , p) + eAlF(p)d G(40 (s, p) I|, p)d 
smin o(8,P) 
= ~~~~~Alf (q)d 
-[1+K- F(p)]2 fp 1 e-Al[F(q)-F(p)jddq 
[8+ /t 1 _+ + AlF(p)12 e-Al F(p) + Ei (-[5 + x + AlF(p)]d) - Ei (-[6 + y + Al]d), 
[8 ?+ /+A,1]2 
after integrating by parts and making appropriate changes of variables, and where Ei is the exponen- 
tial integral function (Ei(u) = fU (ex/x) dx or f 7(e-x/x)dx = -Ei(-u)). 
We further need to observe the Poisson exit rate out of a firm of given mpl pi, which equals 
A(pi) = 8 + , + AlF(pi). Looking at equation (7), we realize that the only thing that matters in the 
definition of F(p), besides K1 = A1/(8 +,), is the ranking L(p) of the type-p firms in the population 
of workers. Therefore, the cdf in the population of workers of any observed variable y that is in a 
one-to-one relationship with the p's can be used as an empirical counterpart of L(p): provided that 
yj is related to pj through the increasing function y(p) = E[U(w)lp] (by Identifying Assumption 2), 
the cdf of yf, (denoted by Z) in the population of workers equals the cdf of firm types in that same 
population, i.e. Z(yj) = L(pj) for any firm j. The sampling probabilities F(pj) can thus be redefined 
from equation (7) as 
(23) 1 + KlF(p1)= 1+Kl l +KlZ(yj)' 
Replacing F(pj) by Z(yj) using this equation implies a new dependence of the likelihood function 
on transition rates through the parameter Kl. 3 Using the estimator (23), A(pi) rewrites as a function 
of the observed average earnings utilities: 
A (yi)=(+ &) 1 +K, 
1 + K1Z(yi) 
Since Z(yi) is recorded for all of the N firms corresponding to the N employment spells dli, we can 
use those observations in the likelihood derived below. 
Using the last equation together with (22), we come up with an expression of ?2i: 
?2i = 1-l{ni = 0}-[1-2 l{ni = 0}] 
xl 1 ] + Ei( 
_ 
z())Ei (- (5+ u) (1+Kl)d)| We now KIZurn2 to wchd+KZ(yj) it 
We now turn to ?li, which has different expressions depending on worker i's particular history. 
39 This technique was already used by Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) for the estima- 
tion of the BM model. 
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(i) First employment spell censored. Given the Poisson exit rate out of a job derived above, the 
probability that an employement spell at firm i last longer than T is given by 
e-,(Yi )T 
I + K, Z(yi-) ] 
(ii) Job-to-job transition after the first employment spell.40 Here we know that the first job spell has 
a duration of exactly d1i, an event that has probability A(yi) exp { -, (yi)d1i }. We also know that the 
transition is made directly toward another job, which has conditional probability A1F(pi)/ A(pi). The 
probability of observing such a transition is therefore: 
i1i = Al F(pi)e-A(Yi)dli 
(8+p&)K Z(yK ) exp r (8+I)(1+Kl)dli1 
1 + K,Z(yi) 1 + KlZ(Yi) J 
(iii) Permanent exit from the sample. Again here the probability of observing a first job spell of 
length d1i equals A(yi) exp {- A(yi)d1i}. Now since the subsequent spell is censored, there is no way 
we can know for sure whether the worker has permanently left the labor force or just experiences 
a protracted period of unemployment. The conditional probability that worker i's initial exit from 
the sample corresponds to a "death" is ,a/A(yi). Similarly, this exit is the result of a layoff with 
probability /1A(yi). In the latter case, however, the fact that worker i does not re-enter the panel 
before date T can be caused either by this worker's "death" occurring before he/she finds a new 
job, or by this worker not dying before T but simply experiencing a protracted unemployment spell. 
Overall, the conditional probability of not seeing worker i reappear in the sample before date T, 
given a transition at date dli is given by 
A(y) + [f ilie-x`eA? dx + e( ?o]. 
The contribution to the likelihood of an observation like case (iii) is the product of the above two 
probabilities: 
5 + /I + AO 1+K 1di fli = [uw +A + Ae- (A+AO)T e- lS)I+K IZ(Y ) l 
F -8 1- e-(A+AO)T 1 (8 + AL)(+ K1)d 
= +/1-SAo A + AO ]exp L1 + K Z(yi) dli] 
(iv) Job-to-unemployment transition followed by a reentry. Once again the probability of observing 
a first job spell of length d1i equals A(yi) exp {- A(yi)d1i}. Concerning the subsequent spell, we know 
in this case that it can only be an unemployment spell of exact length d2i. The conditional probability 
of such a spell is 
) Aoe-(A+AO)d2i 
A(yi) 
which implies a contribution to the likelihood expressed as 
tl S AO exp [ ( 1 + _) (1( +K )d di - (/- + Ao) d2i] ~1i = AoexP[ 1+ K,Z(yi)J 
40 We arbitrarily define a job-to-job transition as an employer change with an intervening unem- 
ployment spell of less than 15 days. This convention can be varied within a reasonable range without 
dramatically affecting the estimates. 
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The complete likelihood of the N observations (K = '1i x '2i) can thus be written as a function 
of the sole transition parameters 8, ,u, AO, and K1. We maximize the likelihood with respect to the 
transition rates, treating the function Z as a nuisance parameter that is estimated by integration 
of a kernel density estimator of the density z(y) = Z'(y). The use of a smoother estimator than 
the empirical cdf of the distribution {lyf , . . . , YfN } slightly improves the numerical outcomes in the 
subsequent estimation stages. 
B.2. Estimation of the Employer's MPL p Given the Mean Wage Utility y, the Distribution of Firm 
Productivities, and the Discount Rate p from a Cross-section of Firm and Worker Data 
The previous stage has provided estimates of cdf Z and the transition parameters (in particular 
K1 = A1/(8 +,)). From now on, we shall thus consider Z and K1 known. What is left to be estimated is 
the two distributions of heterogeneity parameters (p and s), plus one scalar parameter: the discount 
rate p. The discount rate and the function determining the firm p given the mean earnings utilities 
y are going to be jointly estimated using the initial cross section of firm yj's. An estimate of the 
distribution of worker abilities will be finally obtained from a cross-section of worker observations 
(wi, f) 
B.2.1. Estimation of p and b Given y and o- = p/(p + 5 +,u) 
We first construct an estimator of the marginal productivity of labor (p) from the observed mean 
utility, y. We do this by inverting the function y(p) defined in (13). Substituting p(y) for p in 
expression (13) and differentiating once with respect to y, using equality (23) to substitute (1 + KI)! 
(1 + KlZ(y)) for F(p(y)), yields a first-order differential equation. Specifically, we get, after some 
rearrangements, 
2 y)1 +Ki 1+K~ (24) ( Z(y) [U(p(y) )-y] + [ U'(p(y))p'(y)- 1] =- - 1 
G - un) Z(Y) K1Z(y) 1-o 
At the maximum observed value of y, say Ymax for which Z(Ymax) = 0, the above equation implies the 
following initial condition: 
U(P(ymax)) = Ymax + 1+K1 
2K1 Z'(Ymax) 
which holds true only if p'(y) is not infinite at Ymax or equivalently if f (pma) is nonzero. But it must 
be the case that f(pmax) # 0; otherwise the type Pmax firms would employ no worker. 
Equation (24) solves as 
(25) U(p(y)) = Y + K,z(Y) J-5 Z(t 1 1 lZ() 1]K dx 
with, at the limit when y = Ymax 
(26) u ( (YJ) YMX + 1+K1 (26) U(P(Ym~)) = max + 2KlZ'(Yma) 
Equation (25) can be used to predict the values pJ corresponding to all values yj for any given value 
of 0r=p1(p+5+l)- 
Note that the differential equation providing expression (25) can be solved even if function 
y(p) = E[U(w)lp] is not everywhere increasing. If y(p) is not invertible, then y(p(y)) is not nec- 
essarily equal to y for all values of y. Using expression (25) to estimate p for all values of y in the 
observation sample: pj = p(yj), j = 1, . . ., M, and then expression (13) to obtain a prediction of 
yj given p1: y(pj) = E[U(w)Ip = pj], the comparison of yj's and y(p1)'s provides a natural way of 
checking the validity of Identifying Assumption 2. 
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Now observe that expression (25) can be computed whatever the value of U(b), but this is not 
the case of expression (13). If y(p) = E[U(w)lp] is increasing for all p, then it must be that, at the 
true value of 0, K1, and U(b): 
U(pj) -yj -[1 + K1F(p1)]2 j- 1 2K1Fq) U'(q)dq 
Pmin [1 + K,F(q)] 
= 1 + ( )K1 [1 + K,F(Pj)] [U(Pmin) -U(b)] 
for all j = 1, . M. Hence, regressing the variable in the left-hand side of this equality on ((1 + (1- 
0-)K1)/(1 + K1)2)[1 + KjF(pj)]2 provides a consistent estimate of U(Pmin) - U(b) and the R2 of this 
regression, a quantitative assessment of the validity of Identifying Assumption 2. We use weighted 
OLS, weighing each squared residual by the corresponding value of firm size/within-firm variance of 
U(w). This heteroskedasticity correction follows from the application of the Central-Limit Theorem 
(see equation (14).4 
B.2.2. Estimation of or and VU () 
The preceding step allows estimation of p given y up to a predefined value of oc, say p(y; cr) 
to emphasize the dependence on o. The parameter o remains to be estimated. We estimate oc so 
as to maximize the fit of the model to the within-firm second-order moments of wage utilities. The 
idea is that the discount rate conditions the amount of earnings workers are willing to trade today in 
exchange for better earnings prospects tomorrow. It is therefore a determinant of within-firm wage 
dispersion.42 
A consistent estimate of o and VU(?) is thus obtained using weighted nonlinear least squares, by 
minimizing with respect to o and VU(?) the weighted sum of squared errors: 
M 
(27) WSSE = w[E[U(wj)2Ii E Ij] - E[U(w)21p = p(y1; )]] 
j=1 
where the weights wj are computed by application of the Central Limit Theorem,43 and where 
E [ U (wi I i E Ij] is an estimator of the within-firm mean squared earnings utility obtained by smooth- 
ing the empirical means of firms with close values of yj by a standard Nadaraya-Watson kernel 
estimator. Practically, we run the regression on a subset of 500 equidistant values of yj to reduce 
computational costs. We also use the fact that the conditional mean of squared earnings utilities is 
linear in VU(?), and iterate weighted OLS for each value of o = p/(p 8 +u Pt) in a grid of step 
size 1% over [0, 1]. We select the value of o that yields the minimal value of WSSE. We naturally 
constrain VU(?) to be nonnegative. 
41 Note that under the null that Identifying Assumption 2 is satisfied, a direct estimate of U(b) is 
obtained using the expression: 
U(Pmin) = Ymin + [U(Pmin) - U(b)] [1 + Kl (1 -)] 
(Set y = Ymin and p = Pmin in (13)). 42 Formally, p enters the coefficient in front of the integral in the definition (3) of 4(s, p, p'). 
Apart from personal abilities s, this integral is the only term in the wage equation that varies within 
the firm. 
43 The regression weights are given by the following expression: 
#Ij 
Wi 
~V[ UTW, I i E Ij1 
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We use the result of Appendix A.3 to derive the form of E[U(w)2 lp]. Simple algebra (the details 
of which can be found in the working paper available on our web page) shows that 
(28) E[U(w)2 Ip] = m2(p) + VU(s)[1 + (1- a)2m2(p) + 2(1 - o-)ml (p)] 
where 
(29) ml(p) = E[U(w)lp] 
= U(p)-[l +KlF(p)]2 fP 1+Kl o-)F(q) U'(q)dq 
'Pmin [1+K,F(q)]2 
-[l+Kl KF(P)2 K(1+ K1)2 [U(Pmin)-U(b)] 
and 
(30) m2(p) = 2U(p)m1(p) 
-U(p)2 
+ 2[1 + Kl F(p)] f [1 + Ki (1- 0)F(q)] Uq +rK (q) U'(q)dq 
Pmin [1+ K,F(q)]2 
+ [1+ KlF(P)]2 (1+ ) )2[U(pmm) - U(b)]2. 
B.3. Log-wage Variance Decomposition and Estimation of the Density of Worker Abilities 
The last parameter that is left to estimate at this point is the distribution of workers' abilities ?. 
The preceding section has shown how one can estimate the variance of U(?). This estimate is only 
useful to the extent that it allows a test of whether workers indeed differ in ability (VU(?) : 0) or 
not (VU(?) = 0), but quantitative differences in VU(?) for different choices of the utility function 
are not interpretable." A nonparametric estimator of the entire distribution of ln - will be presented 
in the next paragraph. For now, we want to focus on the sole variance of this distribution in order to 
be able to decompose the total variance of log wages as indicated in Section 3.5. 
B.3. 1. Log-wage Variance Decomposition Using a Cross-section of Worker Data 
We have shown in Section 3.4 that the cross-sectional distribution of wages is the distribution of 
4(s, q, p) = s4(1, q, p), where s, p, q are three random variables such that: 
(i) ? is independent of (p, q), 
(ii) the cdf of the marginal distribution of ? is H over [si, -max], 
(iii) the cdf of the marginal distribution of p is L over [pm, Pma] and 
(iv) the cdf of the conditional distribution of q given p is G over {b} U [Pmin, p] such that 
G(q) = G(4(s, q, p)l, p) 
[1 + KlF(p)]2 
[1 + KlF(q)12 
for all q E {b}U[Pmin,P]. 
In order to estimate the contribution of the person and firm effects and the contribution of search 
frictions to the cross-sectional variance of wages we simulate a sample of couples (pi, q,) such that 
pi has distribution L and qi is a random draw from the distribution G(Ipi). In practice, we proceed 
as follows: for any wage observation wi for a worker i working in a firm fi we compute pi = P(Yf,) 
44 In particular since the normalization EU() = 0 implies different values of E ln s, for example, 
when U varies. 
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using the estimator of the previous step. (The distribution of pi across workers is clearly equal to L.) 
We then draw a value of qi for each i given pi from distribution G(Ipi). 
Subtracting the total variance of the thus obtained ln 4i = ln q5(1, qi, pi)'s from the total variance 
of the ln wi's, we get an estimate of V ln s. To estimate the firm effect VE[ln q5(1, q, p) lp] and the 
friction effect EV[ln 4)(1, q, p)Ip] we compute the empirical mean and variance of the variances and 
means of ln 4)(1, qi, pi) within each firm f . 
A very simple algorithm can be designed to generate random draws from the steady-state distri- 
bution of earnings: 
(i) Draw ? from a distribution with pdf h over [8min, Smax] 
(ii) Independently draw p from a distribution with pdf t over [Pmin' Pmax] 
(iii) Draw q = max(qj, q2) independently of - with qk, k = 1, 2, such that: 
(a) qk = b with probability 
1+KlF(p) 1 
1+K1 1 + K,L(p) 
(b) and with probability 
1 + K, F(p) K1L(p) 1- 
1 + Kj 1+K,L(p) 
qk is a draw from the conditional distribution of productivities truncated above at p, i.e. with density: 
?(q)/L(p) at q E [Pmin 1 P]- 
One easily verifies that drawing q conditional on p in this manner indeed simulates a random 
variable with the appropriate distribution. 
B.3.2. Deconvolution Kernel Estimation of the Distribution of ? 
If the preceding step delivers a positive estimate of Vln,s, then the distribution of individual 
abilities is nondegenerate and one can obtain an estimate of the whole distribution of ? by using the 
nonparametric deconvolution method of Stefanski and Caroll (1990). 
Given that the cross-sectional distribution of wages equals the distribution of s4)(1, q, p) with ? 
and (q, p) independently distributed, the cross-sectional distribution of log wages has to be equal 
to the convolution of the cross-sectional distribution of ln s and the cross-sectional distribution of 
ln q5(1, q, p). Using the individual sample constructed in the previous paragraph, we obtain an esti- 
mate of the density of ln ? at any point x as (in this paragraph i denotes the complex number ): 
(31) h]nE(x) = 2 j V(t)e dt, 
where x(t) is the ratio of the empirical characteristic functions of wI and j: 
_(t) = N U= exp(it lnWk) 
N k=l exp (it In k)' 
and where the bandwidth A is obtained as a zero of 
I(A) = N 2-(N+1) Eexp nwk 2 N-iL N k=1 A 1 
We also estimate the cdf of ln - to simulate cross-sections of log wages. It is sufficient for that to 
integrate e-itx in (31) with respect to x:45 
1,1/A eitx 
Hine(X) =(t) it dt + Hine (lnsmin). 
To draw random values of ln in distribution H1nE we draw uniform numbers in [0, 1] and transform 
them by the inverse of H1nE. 
45It is straightforward to show that the integral is well defined at t = 0. 
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